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STRUKTUR KEPEMILIKAN, KINERJA BANK, DAN RISIKO: SEJUMLAH 
BUKTI DI INDONESIA 
 
Oleh :  
Yohana Tamara 
NIM S. 411508020 
 
ABSTRAK  
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk secara empiris memeriksa kembali perbedaan 
kinerja dan pengambilan risiko perbankan Indonesia pada berbagai struktur 
kepemilikan. Struktur kepemilikan bank di Indonesia dibagi ke dalam lima kategori 
utama, seperti: bank milik negara, bank pembangunan daerah, bank asing dan 
campuran, bank domestik yang dimiliki oleh lembaga asing, dan bank domestik yang 
dimiliki oleh institusi lokal. Kinerja Bank diukur dengan Return on Assets (ROA) 
dan Return on Equity (ROE). Sementara pengambilan risiko bank diukur dengan nilai 
Z-Score, yang dikembangkan oleh Boyd dan Graham (1986). Analisis dalam 
penelitian ini juga mempertimbangkan karakteristik bank sebagai variabel kontrol, 
meliputi: ukuran Bank, leverage Bank, dan loan to deposit ratio (LDR). Pengamatan 
dalam penelitian ini melibatkan 110 bank komersial di Indonesia selama periode 
2005-2013 dalam dataset bulanan. Metode analisis dalam penelitian ini menggunakan 
metode Panel Least Square.  
Beberapa hasil dapat disimpulkan dari analisis data: Pertama, kepemilikan 
pemerintah Negara berpengaruh negatif terhadap profitabilitas bank yang diukur 
dengan Return on Equity dan berpengaruh negative terhadap risiko bank yang diukur 
dengan Z-Score ROA. Kedua, kepemilikan pemerintah daerah secara positif 
mempengaruhi profitabilitas bank, baik ROE dan ROA; dan secara negatif 
mempengaruhi pengambilan risiko bank yang diukur dengan Z-Score ROA. 
Kepemilikan asing dan joint venture secara positif mempengaruhi profitabilitas bank, 
baik Return on Equity (ROE) dan Return on Asset (ROA) dan juga berpengaruh 
positif terhadap pengambilan risiko yang diukur dengan Z-Score ROE. Robustness 
check juga telah dilakukan dalam penelitian ini yang menyimpulkan bahwa 
kepemilikan asing secara keseluruhan lebih baik dari kepemilikan pemerintah secara 
keseluruhan dalam hal kinerja dan pengambilan risiko. 
 
Kata kunci: Struktur kepemilikan, Kinerja, Pengambilan Risiko, Return on Asset, 
Return on Equity, Z-Score. 
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OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, BANK PERFORMANCE, AND RISK: SOME 
INDONESIAN EVIDENCE 
 
By: 
Yohana Tamara 
NIM S. 411508020 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study aims to empirically re-examine the performance and risk taking 
differences of Indonesian banks across ownership structure. The ownership structures 
of Indonesian banks are disentangled into five main categories, such as: State-owned 
banks, regional development banks, foreign and joint venture banks, domestic banks 
owned by foreign institutions, and domestic banks owned by local institutions. Bank 
performance is measured by Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE). 
While the risk-taking of banks is measured by the value of Z-Score, proposed by 
Boyd and Graham (1986). The analysis in this study is also considering the 
characteristics of the bank as a control variable, includes: bank size, bank leverage, 
and loan to deposit ratio (LDR). The observation in this study involved 110 
commercial banks in Indonesia over the period of 2005 to 2013 in monthly dataset. 
The method of analysis in this study is using Panel Least Square method.  
Several results can be concluded from the data analysis: First, state-ownership 
negatively affects banks profitability as measured by Return on Equity and negatively 
affects bank risk taking measured by Z-Score ROA. Second, regional government 
ownership positively affects banks profitability, both ROE and ROA; and negatively 
affects bank risk taking measured by Z-Score ROA. Foreign banks and joint venture 
banks, positively affect banks profitability, both Return on Equity (ROE) and Return 
on Asset (ROA) and also positively affects bank risk-taking as measured by Z-Score 
ROE. Robustness test have also been performed in this study which concluded that 
foreign ownership as a whole are better than government ownership as a whole in 
terms of performance and risk taking.  
Keywords: Ownership structure, Performance, Risk Taking, Return on Asset, Return 
on Equity, Z-Score 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A. Research Background 
Banking sector is one of the most vital sectors that form the economic 
structure of a country. Banks and the banking industry, as a major player in 
economic sector, have function as an intermediary institution in financial 
sector that has an important role in the economy of the State. In micro level, 
banks functioning channel funds from the client who have excess funds to 
businesses and individuals who need funds in order to facilitate the efforts of 
the parties concerned. The function of the banking industry on micro level in 
Indonesia is stated in Undang- Undang No. 10 tahun 1998 about Banking, in 
which commercial banks are defined as "Bank conducting conventional 
business or based on sharia principles, which in its activities providing 
services in payment transactions, including credit." In addition, the banking 
sector also plays a role in control mechanism of the firms, as the party which 
monitors the performance of the firm, and plays an important role in corporate 
governance through the enforcement of contracts and the support of the 
payment system (Levine, 1997). At the macro level, the banking industry 
serves as a source of financing for economic development and as a tool in the 
implementation of monetary policy.  
The banking industry is growing rapidly in developing countries, such 
as Indonesia. Especially the impact of post-crisis monetary policy in 1997-
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1998 resulted major changes on the banking conditions in Indonesia.  There 
are at least three policies implemented by Indonesian Government along with 
Bank Indonesia to strengthen the banking sector in Indonesia: First, a policy 
related to the privatization conducted by the government for the private banks 
which follows the restructuring program and the provision of bail out funds 
thus many private banks belong to the government. Second, the policy stated 
in Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 29 Tahun 1999 which regulates about 
Purchase of Shares in Commercial Bank, in which foreign investors can take 
control of  up to 99% stake in Indonesian bank, thus it can attract  many 
foreign investors to invest in Indonesia's banking sector. Third, the policy of 
the Central Bank (Bank Indonesia) associated with the increase in the 
minimum capital of banks, so the banks with limited capital will face two 
choices: raising capital or selling its shares to investors. All these policies 
affect the composition of ownership in Indonesian banks. There are a large 
number of banks in Indonesia, with varying ownership structures. In general, 
the ownership structures of Indonesian banks are divided into five categories: 
State-owned banks, regional development banks, foreign and joint venture 
banks, domestic banks owned by foreign institutions, and domestic banks 
owned by local institutions. Based on the Statistik Perbankan Indonesia (SPI) 
issued by the Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (OJK), a map of Indonesian banks 
ownership structures for 10 years (in 2006-2015) are as follows:  
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Table 1.1The Map of Indonesian Banks Ownership Structures 2006-2015 
OWNERSHIP 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
State-Owned Banks 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Regional Development 
Banks 
26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Foreign-Owned Banks 11 11 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Joint Venture Banks 17 17 15 16 15 14 14 14 12 11 
Domestic Private-Foreign 35 35 32 34 36 36 36 36 38 38 
Domestic Private-Non 
Foreign 
36 36 36 31 31 30 30 30 29 27 
TOTAL BANKS 130 130 124 121 122 120 120 120 119 118 
      Source  : Statistik Perbankan Indonesia (2006-2015) 
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The issue of ownership structure is very important for the banking 
industries because several factors interact with and alter governance, such as 
the quality of bank regulation and supervision. Moreover, as an intermediary 
institution, bank in its operations use more funds from the public compared to 
their own capital or capital raised from shareholders. These conditions 
encourage related parties involved in the banking sector conduct an 
assessment of the health of banks. One of the main indicators that can be used 
as the basis of assessment is the bank's financial statements. By using various 
financial ratios obtained from the financial statements of banks, both public 
and investors can determine the performance and the level of risk of the bank, 
so that the security guarantees for the funds invested can be measured.  
Profitability is an appropriate indicator to measure the financial 
performance of a bank. Generally, profitability is the company's ability to earn 
income from its business activities. Profitability measurement that is generally 
used in banking industry is Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity 
(ROE). Return on Asset (ROA) refers to the measurement of the bank's 
efficiency and effectiveness in generating profits through the utilization of the 
assets owned. Bank Indonesia and many previous researches attach more on 
the assessing of Return on Asset (ROA) compared with Return on Equity 
(ROE), for the calculation of the profitability by ROA measured through 
assets, which mostly come from public funds deposits.  
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Another parameter that can be appropriately used to measure the 
financial strength of banks is the bank's risk assessment. Based on Peraturan 
Dewan Gubernur Bank Indonesia BI No. 11/8/PDG/2009 about Risk Based 
on Bank Supervision, risk is defined as the potential occurrence of an event 
that causes damage to the bank. Bank risks arise as a result of the occurrence 
of events that are negative and undesirable. An indicator that can be properly 
used to measure the risk of bank is calculating the value of the Z-Score (Boyd 
and Graham, 1986). Z- Score, is one form of financial analysis, which used to 
predict the probability of failure of the banks. Higher values of Z-Score imply 
lower probabilities of banks failure. The calculation of Z- Score in this 
research is using the average and standard deviation of banks profitability, 
which are measured by Return on Asset (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE).  
This study aims to empirically re-examine the performance and risk 
taking differences of Indonesian banks across ownership structure. The 
ownership structure of Indonesian banks are disentangled into five main 
categories such as State-owned banks, regional development banks, foreign 
and joint venture banks, domestic banks owned by foreign institutions, and 
domestic banks owned by local institutions. Bank performance is measured by 
Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE). While the risk-taking 
of banks is measured by the value of Z-Score, proposed by Boyd and Graham 
(1986). The analysis in this study is also considering the characteristics of the 
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bank as a control variable, includes: bank size, bank leverage, and loan to 
deposit ratio (LDR). 
Ownership structure is an important component that determines the 
success of an institution. Therefore, the ownership structure becomes an 
important topic for academic explorations and policy making. Several 
previous studies that support this research is conducted by Alejandro Micco 
(2007) concerning Bank Ownership and Performance, which focused 
observations on profitability at state banks and private banks, where the 
ownership of private banks is divided into two categories :  foreign-owned 
banks and local investors-owned banks. Furthermore, other literature that 
supports this research was conducted by Boubakri et al. (2005) about 
Privatization and Bank Performance in Developing Country, which focuses 
observation on profitability, efficiency, credit risk, and capital adequacy at the 
bank with the ownership structure divided into four categories:  The 
Government, Foreign, Industrial Groups, and Individual. Based on this 
background, the researcher took the research titled: “OWNERSHIP 
STRUCTURE, BANK PERFORMANCE, AND RISK: SOME 
INDONESIAN EVIDENCE”  
B. Introduction to Problem Definition 
The banking sector, which is a major player in economic sector, is one 
of the most vital sectors that form the economic structure of a country. The 
banking industry is growing rapidly in a country with the characteristics of an 
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emerging economy, like Indonesia. There are a large number of banks in 
Indonesia, particularly as a result of post-crisis monetary policies in 1997-
1998 which bring a profound impact on the banking conditions in Indonesia. 
Based on the data stated above, there are major changes in banks ownership 
structure as a result of those policies. Privatization has minimized the number 
of banks owned by the government and encouraged the growing of private 
banks, both owned by local and foreign institutions. Besides, foreign and joint 
venture banks are also growing rapidly in Indonesia.  
Boubakri (2005) stated that privatization of the banking sector, 
particularly in countries characterized by emerging economies, are often 
accompanied by a process called "Financial Liberalization" that 
fundamentally change the way financial sector managed. Those process can 
affect the value of the bank, the growth opportunities, risk exposure of banks, 
and hence the performance of banks.  If the privatization process is 
unsuccessful, it can result in a loss to many parties, especially the depositor, 
which eventually will lead to financial crisis. As already known, bank is an 
intermediary institution, which in its operations use more funds from the 
public compared to their own capital or capital raised from shareholders. 
These conditions encourage related parties involved in the banking sector 
conduct an assessment of the health of banks.  
Ownership structure in banking sector becomes an interesting and 
important topic for academic explorations and policy making, especially when 
it is associated with performance and risk taking differences across many 
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kinds of ownership structures. Several previous studies with various results 
have concerned about ownership structures. First, previous research 
conducted by Linqiang Huang and Sheng Xiao (2012), explained about how 
government ownership affects firm performance. This study concluded that 
the profitability of the firm, as measured by Return on Sales (ROS) is 
negatively affected by the government ownership. This research stated that 
privatization, which lower the government ownership can improve firm’s 
performance as a result.  
This study result is supported by another prior study conducted by 
Alejandro Micco (2007) concerning Bank Ownership and Performance, which 
focused observations on profitability at the government-owned banks and 
private banks, which the ownership of private banks is divided into two 
categories:  foreign-owned banks and local investors-owned bank. This study 
concluded several results: First, State-Owned Bank located in developing 
countries tend to have profitability (measured by Return on Asset) much 
lower (0.9% lower) than domestic privately owned bank. Second, foreign 
bank located in developed countries tend to be more profitable (0.37% higher) 
than private domestic bank.  
Previous study conducted by Boubakri (2005) provides a contrast view 
for this topic. This study is about Privatization and Bank Performance in 
Developing Country, which focuses observation on profitability, efficiency, 
credit risk, and capital adequacy at the bank with the ownership structure 
divided into four categories:  The Government, Foreign, Industrial Groups, 
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and Individual. Several results are concluded: First, privatization is not 
significantly improved bank performance, because when the government 
relinquishes control, profitability gains are lower. Second, foreign control in 
ownership is not significantly affected profitability, and the result associated 
with bank risk-taking, the credit risk (measured by Non-Performing Loans 
Ratio) in foreign-owned banks is lower than domestic private banks.  
A wide range of variations of the previous study results about this 
issue make it more interesting to analyze, particularly in the context of the 
banking sector in Indonesia. This study provides better insight for the 
development of topics related to ownership structure of the bank. In addition 
to comprehensively divided bank ownership structure into five main 
categories (state-owned banks, regional development banks, foreign and joint 
venture banks, domestic banks owned by foreign institutions, and domestic 
banks owned by local institutions), this study focuses not only on the 
profitability differences across the ownership structure (as measured by ROA 
and ROE), but also focuses on the risk taking of each ownership structure, 
which measured by the value of Z-Score, as proposed by Boyd and Graham 
(1986), which indicates the probability of failure of a given bank.  This study 
also concern bank characteristics as a control variable include: bank size, bank 
leverage, and loan to deposit ratio (LDR).  
C. Problem Definition and Research Question  
The majority of previous studies regarding with the relationship 
between the ownership structure on bank performance and risk taking shows 
10 
 
 
 
varying results. Research conducted by Linqiang Huang and Sheng Xiao 
(2012), about how government ownership affects firm performance, 
concluded that the profitability of the firm, as measured by Return on Sales 
(ROS) is negatively affected by the government ownership. This study result 
is supported by another prior study by Alejandro Micco (2007) regarding 
Bank Ownership and Performance, which concluded several results : First, 
State-Owned Bank located in developing countries tend to have profitability 
(measured by Return on Asset) much lower (0,9% lower)  than domestic 
privately owned bank. Second, foreign bank located in developed countries 
tend to be more profitable (0.37% higher) than private domestic bank.  
Another prior study by Rafael La Porta (2002) regarding with 
Government Ownership of Banks also stated that higher government 
ownership  is associated with slower financial development, lower growth of 
per capita income, and productivity. Related with bank risk taking, two prior 
studies, conducted by Mahmud Hossain (2013) and Alejandro Micco (2006) 
reported similar results: state-owned bank plays “smoothing” role. Public 
bank managers are lack of incentives to make profit, so they do not 
aggressively look for lending opportunities and tends to act to minimize the 
risk. This study shows that state-owned bank lending is less responsive to 
macroeconomic shocks than the lending of private banks (both domestically 
and foreign-owned banks). 
In contrast, prior study conducted by Boubakri (2005) about 
Privatization and Bank Performance in Developing Country, concluded 
11 
 
 
 
several result:  First, privatization is not significantly improved bank 
performance, because when the government relinquish control, profitability 
gain is lower. Second, foreign control in ownership is not significantly 
affected profitability, and the result associated with bank risk-taking, the 
credit risk (measured by Non-Performing Loans Ratio) in foreign-owned 
banks is lower than domestic private banks. Hence, based on the discussion 
above, the formulation of the research problem is:  
What is the effect of bank ownership structure, which divided into five 
categories: State-owned banks, regional development banks, foreign and joint 
venture banks, domestic banks owned by foreign institutions and domestic 
banks owned by local institution on bank performance and risk taking in 
Indonesia?  
D. Research Objectives 
First, this study is aimed to present cross sectional data to provide 
better insight about the effect of Ownership Structure on Bank Performance, 
which is measured by Return on Asset (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) in 
Indonesian Commercial Banks. Bank characteristics are concerned as control 
variables, include:  bank size, bank leverage, and loan to deposit ratio (LDR).  
Secondly, this study is aimed to improve the understanding on the 
effect of Ownership Structure on Risk Taking, which is measured by the value 
of Z-Score (Z-Score ROA and also Z-Score ROE), reflecting the probability 
of failure in Indonesian Commercial Banks. Bank characteristics are 
12 
 
 
 
concerned as control variables, including:  bank size, bank leverage, and loan 
to deposit ratio (LDR).  
Thirdly, this study is meant to provide better insight for the policy-
maker associated with the establishment of the optimal ownership structure, to 
improve the banking sector in Indonesia. 
E. Research Contribution 
Ownership structure is an important component that determines the 
success of an institution. Therefore, the ownership structure becomes an 
important topic for academic explorations and policy making. The current 
study contributes to improve understanding of how bank ownership structure 
could affect bank performance and also bank risk-taking. Specifically in 
Indonesian context where the impact of post-crisis monetary policy in 1997-
1998 resulting major changes on the banking conditions in Indonesia. The 
financial liberalization policy in Indonesia impacts on the large number of 
banks in Indonesia with varying ownership structures. Hence, it is important 
to develop a literature that provides an understanding associated with 
comparison of various types of bank ownership structure in Indonesia. This 
study extends previous research in examining how bank ownership structure, 
which divided into five categories: State-owned banks, regional development 
banks, domestic banks owned by foreign institutions, domestic banks owned 
by local institutions, foreign banks and joint venture banks can affect bank 
performance and bank risk-taking. Furthermore, this study provides empirical 
13 
 
 
 
evidence and more insight related to the type of banks ownership structure in 
Indonesia which is the best in terms of performance and risk-taking.  
This research also contributes in managerial practice, specifically to 
improve the condition of banking sector in Indonesia. With the results 
presented in this study, government and managers can be helped in making 
decisions related to the establishment of optimal ownership structure. The 
results showed that foreign ownership is the best type of ownership structure, 
in terms of profitability and risk taking. Therefore, bank needs to consider the 
entry of foreign investors to improve various aspects of the bank's policy, in 
order to improve the overall performance of the bank. The presence of foreign 
investor may improve the quality and availability of financial services and the 
adoption of modern banking skills and technology (Levine, 1997). 
Particularly for state-owned banks, which this research and also the previous 
researches have proven that state government ownership is the least optimal 
type of ownership; need to consider to reduce the dominance of government 
ownership and increase the foreign ownership.  
F. Thesis Structure 
The second chapter of this thesis consists of a number of literature 
studies and previous researches regarding ownership structure on bank 
performance and risk taking. This chapter is also including the theoretical 
framework of this study along with the short introduction and hypotheses 
development.  
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Chapter three of this study contains the research design, which 
includes conceptual framework model, methodology, data collection 
techniques, variables measurement, and data analysis techniques. 
Afterward, the fourth chapter shows the research study. This chapter 
consists of the descriptive study, classical assumption tests, and logistic 
regression analysis on the variables. Last but not least, chapter five presents 
the conclusion, research limitation, and recommendations for future 
researches.  
G. Research Originality 
Although some previous studies have paid special attention to this 
topic, this research provides insight for the development of topics related to 
ownership structure of the bank. First, this study divides the ownership 
structure of banks into five comprehensive detailed categories. Government-
owned banks are divided into two categories: State-owned banks (Bank 
Pemerintah) and regional development banks (Bank Pembangunan Daerah). 
Domestic private banks are divided into two categories: domestic banks 
owned by foreign institutions, and domestic banks owned by local 
institutions; Also there are foreign and joint venture banks. Second, the 
observations in this study not only focuses on variable performance of the 
bank as measured by Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity, but also 
observes banks risk taking in various ownership structure as measured by the 
value of Z-Score, proposed by Boyd and Graham (1986) which divided into 
Z-Score ROA and Z-Score ROE to describe the probability of failure. Third, 
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this study involved bank characteristics as aspects to be considered as a 
control variable, include bank size, bank leverage, and loan to deposit ratio 
(LDR). Furthermore, the study is using 110 commercial banks in Indonesia 
over the period of 2005-2013. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
It is clearly known that institutions evolve to capture economic gains. 
A way that institutions do to maximize their economic benefit is through the 
ownership structure, thus it becomes an essential component of economic and 
political institutions. Ownership structure is a reflection of good corporate 
governance which refers to the process and structure used to direct and 
manage the company's business activities in order to enhance shareholder 
value and wealth.  
1. Stated- Owned Banks  
Micco (2007) defined state-owned banks as banks with government 
ownership exceed 50%. Post-crisis policies made by Government along 
with Bank Indonesia in 1997- 1998 provided dramatic changes in 
Indonesian banking sector. This policy led to the development of 
privatization, both by domestic institutions and foreign institutions, which 
is identical to financial liberalization in the banking sector (Boubakri, 
2005). Surprisingly, despite the financial liberalization policy has been 
widely adopted, government ownership of banks remained prominent in 
many countries, especially in countries characterize with developing 
economies. Previous study stated that countries in Asia-Pacific region are 
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known for higher government intervention in economy and particularly in 
the banking sector. (Hossain, et al. 2013)  
Several previous researches have focused the observations on state-
owned banks provided various results. Previous study conducted by 
Linqiang Huang and Sheng Xiao (2012), explained about how government 
ownership affects firm performance. This study concluded that the 
profitability of the firm, as measured by Return on Sales (ROS) is 
negatively affected by the government ownership. This research stated 
that privatization, which lower the government ownership can improve 
firm’s performance as a result. 
Results concluded by Linqiang Huang (2012) is supported by another 
prior study conducted by Alejandro Micco (2007) concerning Bank 
Ownership and Performance, which focused observations on profitability 
at the government-owned banks and private banks. This study concluded 
that state-owned bank located in developing countries tend to have 
profitability (measured by Return on Asset) much lower (0,9% lower)  
than domestic privately owned bank. Paolo Sapienza (2004) argued that 
profitability is not enough be used as a measurement of the success of 
banks, because in addition to gain profit, state-owned banks aim to 
maximize broader social objectives.  
Another study conducted by Allen, et al. (2009) regarding Bank 
Ownership and Efficiency in China concluded several findings: First, state 
owned banks, in the context of the central government bank which holds a 
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majority market share in China (The Chinese Big Four State Owned 
Banks) have the lowest level of proft efficiency compared to other types 
of banks. Second, in terms of cost efficiency, state owned banks are the 
most cost efficient banks, since state owned banks spend less on loans 
monitoring activities and the process of screening and investigating 
potential borrowers. That's why, state owned banks are considered as the 
most efficient bank, but has the highest level of credit risk, as measured by 
NPL.  
Related with bank risk taking, two prior studies, conducted by 
Mahmud Hossain (2013) and Alejandro Micco (2006) reported similar 
results: state-owned bank plays “smoothing” role. Public bank managers 
are lack of incentives to make profit, so they do not aggressively look for 
lending opportunities and tends to act to minimize the risk. This study 
shows that state-owned bank lending is less responsive to macroeconomic 
shocks than the lending of private banks (both domestically and foreign-
owned banks). Paolo Sapienza (2004) reported that state-owned banks 
charge lower interest rate than foreign-owned banks in terms of risk 
minimizing (44 basis points lower).  Based on these studies, state-owned 
banks play “smoothing” role and stabilize their lending policy over the 
following reasons:  
a. The principal (states) obtained multiple benefits of a more stable 
macroeconomic environment. 
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b. The implementation of stable lending policies will be able to minimize 
the risk of bank failures that are more likely happened during 
recessions. 
c. Public bank managers are lack of incentives to make profit, so they do 
not aggressively look for lending opportunities and tends to act to 
minimize the risk. 
d. There is a possibility of political influence in the lending policy in 
state-owned banks.  
(Alejandro Micco, Ugo Panizza, 2006) 
In contrast, there is prior study conducted by Boubakri (2005) about 
Privatization and Bank Performance in Developing Country, which 
focuses observation on profitability, efficiency, credit risk, and capital 
adequacy at the bank, with the ownership structure divided into four 
categories:  The Government, Foreign, Industrial Groups, and Individual. 
This study concluded privatization is not significantly improved bank 
performance, which is measured by Return on Equity (ROE) because 
when the government relinquished control, profitability gain is lower. 
Second, government control in ownership is associated with low risk-
taking policies, compared with private control in ownership, because the 
management is focused on bank survival. 
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2. Regional Development Banks 
If the state- owned banks are government banks within the scope of 
central government, regional development banks are banks with the scope 
of local (regional) area.  Capital stock of regional development banks 
majority owned by the local government. According to Undang-Undang 
Nomor 13 tahun 1962, regional development banks are banks established 
to assist the central government in financing national development efforts, 
functioning to help the implementation of economic development evenly 
distributed throughout all regions in Indonesia. Regional development 
banks work as regional economic development and enhance the local 
economic development, to improve people's lives as well as provide 
financing in regional financial development, raise funds, carry out and 
save the local treasury, in addition to run the banking services. Several 
previous researches about government bank focused observations on 
government bank in a country level. This study divides government 
ownership into two categories, at the level of state government and local 
governments and also aims to see the difference between both categories.  
3. Private-Owned Banks  
Micco (2007) classified private-owned banks as those banks more than 
50% of the shares owned by private sector, both domestic and foreign 
institutions. Privatization of the banking sector is a mechanism that 
emerged in developing countries, such as Indonesia, especially since the 
post-crisis policy in 1997-1998. Boubakri (2005) stated that privatization 
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of the banking sector, particularly in countries characterized by emerging 
economies, is often accompanied by a process called "Financial 
Liberalization" that fundamentally change the way financial sector 
managed. Those process can affect the value of the bank, the growth 
opportunities, risk exposure of banks, and hence the performance of 
banks.  If the privatization process is unsuccessful, it can result in a loss to 
many parties, especially the depositor, which eventually will lead to 
financial crisis.  
Previous literatures have provided various results regarding with 
privately owned banks. Prior study conducted by Alejandro Micco (2007) 
concerning Bank Ownership and Performance, focused observations on 
profitability at the government-owned banks and private banks, which the 
ownership of private banks is divided into two categories:  foreign-owned 
banks and local investors-owned bank. This study concluded several 
results: First, State-Owned Bank located in developing countries tend to 
have profitability (measured by Return on Asset) much lower (0.9% 
lower) than domestic privately owned bank. Second, foreign bank located 
in developed countries tend to be more profitable (0.37% higher) than 
private domestic bank. These results indicate that in order to maximize the 
profitability of private banks, the selection of the ownership structure, 
foreign versus local investors play important role.  
Another prior study conducted by Boubakri (2005) about Privatization 
and Bank Performance in Developing Country, which focuses observation 
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on profitability, efficiency, credit risk, and capital adequacy at the bank, 
with the ownership structure divided into four categories: The 
Government, Foreign, Industrial Groups, and Individual. This study 
concluded several results: First, privatization is not significantly improved 
bank performance, which is measured by Return on Equity (ROE) because 
when the government relinquished control, profitability gain is lower. 
Second, foreign control in ownership is not significantly affected 
profitability, and the result associated with bank risk-taking, the credit risk 
(measured by Non-Performing Loans Ratio) in foreign-owned banks is 
lower than domestic private banks. This study also concluded that banks 
with local institutional ownership control have the highest risk exposure, 
especially related with credit risk and interest rate.  
In order to measure the performance and risk taking of private banks, 
the ownership structure of private bank (owned by foreign institutions or 
domestic) play an important role. Previous research conducted by Allen et 
al. (2009) related to Bank Ownership and Efficiency in China divided 
bank ownership structure into four categories: The Big Four State Owned 
Banks, State Owned Banks Non-Big Four, Majority Private Domestic 
Banks, Majority Private Foreign Banks. This study concluded that: First, 
foreign banks have the highest level of profit efficiency followed by 
private domestic banks in the second rank. Second, adding a minority 
foreign ownership can improve profit and cost efficiency, both on state 
owned banks and the domestic private banks. For example, when the state 
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owned bank added minority foreign ownership, the profit efficiency level 
increased by 20% and the cost efficiency level increased by 30%. This 
study suggested management to reduce state ownership and increase 
foreign ownership.  
4. Foreign Banks 
Previous study by Enrica and Poonam (2006) defined foreign banks 
as:  “Banks with fully owned subsidiaries of foreign institutions or 
domestic banks in which a foreign institution holds a controlling share”. 
As a result of financial liberalization in banking industry, foreign banks 
have a great opportunity to develop, particularly in countries characterized 
with emerging market. Levine (1997) also argued that financial 
liberalization which allows the entry of foreign banks may bring multiple 
benefits:  
a) The presence of foreign banks may improve the quality and 
availability of financial services and the adoption of modern banking 
skills and technology. 
b) Foreign banks may stimulate the development of a bank supervisory 
and legal framework. 
c) It may help to enhance a country’s access to international capital. 
In line with Levine (1997), study conducted by Enrica and Poonam (2006) 
concluded that foreign banks performed significantly better (in terms of 
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profitability and Net Interest Margin) than domestic banks. This due to 
several reasons:  
1. Foreign banks are more profitable and efficient than domestic banks 
because they have to deal with more intense competition in the global 
market. This condition encourages foreign banks to apply better 
regulation and supervision mechanisms than the domestic bank with a 
narrower scope of competition. 
2. Foreign banks are better capitalized because it is easier for them to 
raise capital and liquid funds from international financial markets. 
Furthermore, it is easier for the foreign banks to raise capital fund 
from their parent bank.  
3. Foreign banks operating in a wide international scope so that they are 
considered to be more reputable.  
4. Foreign banks tend to implement more sophisticated risk management 
technique and better system of internal control. 
5. Foreign banks may be less amenable to political pressure.  
B. RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
This study aimed to identify the effect of ownership structure on the 
performance and risk taking of Indonesian banks. The bank's performance in 
this study was measured by Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity 
(ROE). Brigham (2006) defined Return on Asset (ROA) as the measurement 
of the bank's efficiency and effectiveness in generating profits through the 
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utilization of the assets owned. Meanwhile, Return on Equity (ROE) refers to 
the measurement the bank's ability to generate profits through equity capital 
owned. Figure 2.1 below shows the research model of this thesis:  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Research Model 
1. Bank Ownership on Bank Performance  
Previous study regarding bank ownership structure and bank 
performance is conducted by Alejandro Micco (2007), which focused 
observations on profitability at state banks and private banks, where the 
ownership of private banks is divided into two categories:  foreign-owned 
banks and local investors-owned banks. This study concluded that state-
owned bank located in developing countries tend to have profitability 
(measured by Return on Asset) much lower (0.9% lower)  than domestic 
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privately owned bank. Another previous study conducted by Linqiang 
Huang and Sheng Xiao (2012), explained about how government 
ownership affects firm performance. This study concluded that the 
profitability of the firm, as measured by Return on Sales (ROS) is 
negatively affected by the government ownership.   
Another study conducted by Allen, et al. (2009) regarding Bank 
Ownership and Efficiency in China also concluded that state owned 
banks, in the context of the central government bank which holds a 
majority market share in China (The Chinese Big Four State Owned 
Banks) have the lowest level of proft efficiency compared to other types 
of banks. 
Meanwhile, if the state- owned banks are government banks within the 
scope of central government, regional development banks are banks with 
the scope of local (regional) area. Several previous researches about 
government bank focused observations on government bank in a country 
level. This study divides government ownership into two categories, at the 
level of state government and local governments and also aims to see the 
difference between both categories.  
Previous study conducted by Alejandro Micco (2007) also concluded 
that private foreign bank located in developed countries tend to be more 
profitable (0.37% higher) than private domestic bank. In order to measure 
the performance and risk taking of private banks, the ownership structure 
of private bank (owned by foreign institutions or domestic) play an 
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important role. Previous research conducted by Allen et al. (2009) related 
to Bank Ownership and Efficiency in China divided bank ownership 
structure into four categories: The Big Four State Owned Banks, State 
Owned Banks Non-Big Four, Majority Private Domestic Banks, and 
Majority Private Foreign Banks. This study concluded that: First, foreign 
banks have the highest level of profit efficiency followed by private 
domestic banks in the second rank. Second, adding a minority foreign 
ownership can improve profit and cost efficiency, both on state owned 
banks and the domestic private banks. For example, when the state owned 
bank added minority foreign ownership, the profit efficiency level 
increased by 20% and the cost efficiency level increased by 30%. In line 
with Allen et al. (2009) study conducted by Enrica and Poonam (2006) 
concluded that foreign banks performed significantly better (in terms of 
profitability and Net Interest Margin) than domestic banks 
Therefore:  
H1 : Different ownership structures imply different levels of 
profitability as measured by Return on Asset and Return on 
Equity.  
2. Bank Performance and Bank Risk Taking 
An indicator that can be properly used to measure the risk of bank is 
calculating the value of the Z-Score (Boyd and Graham, 1986). Z- Score, 
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is one form of financial analysis, which used to predict the probability of 
failure of the banks. Higher values of Z-Score imply lower probabilities of 
banks failure. The calculation of Z- Score proposed by Boyd and Graham 
(1986) is using the average and standard deviation of banks profitability, 
which are measured by Return on Asset (ROA) and Return on Equity 
(ROE).  
Related with bank risk taking, two prior studies, conducted by 
Mahmud Hossain (2013) and Alejandro Micco (2006) reported similar 
results: state-owned bank plays “smoothing” role. Public bank managers 
are lack of incentives to make profit, so they do not aggressively look for 
lending opportunities and tends to act to minimize the risk. This study 
shows that state-owned bank lending is less responsive to macroeconomic 
shocks than the lending of private banks (both domestically and foreign-
owned banks). Paolo Sapienza (2004) reported that state-owned banks 
charged lower interest rate than foreign-owned banks in terms of risk 
minimizing (44 basis points lower).  
In line with Paolo Sapienza (2004), in terms of cost efficiency, Allen 
et al (2009) concluded that state owned banks are the most cost efficient 
banks, since state owned banks spend less on loans monitoring activities 
and the process of screening and investigating potential borrowers. That's 
why, state owned banks are considered as the most efficient bank, but has 
the highest level of credit risk. Another prior study conducted by Boubakri 
(2005) about Privatization and Bank Performance in Developing Country 
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developed a conclusion associated with bank risk-taking, the credit risk 
(measured by Non-Performing Loans Ratio) in foreign-owned banks is 
lower than domestic private banks. This study also concluded that banks 
with local institutional ownership control have the highest risk exposure, 
especially related with credit risk and interest rate. 
Therefore :  
H2  : Different ownership structures imply different levels of risk as 
measured by the value of Z-Score.    
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
A. Data And Sample 
The subjects of this research are all commercial banks in Indonesia over the 
period of 2005-2013. The overall numbers of samples in this study were 110 
commercial banks, which the ownership structure is disentangled into five 
categories: State-owned banks, regional development banks, foreign and joint 
venture banks, domestic banks owned by foreign institutions and domestic 
banks owned by local institutions.  
B. Data Sources 
This research uses secondary data as a whole, gathered from Laporan Bank 
Umum (LBU), which consist of financial data of 110 commercial banks in 
Indonesia, over the period of 2005-2013 in a monthly dataset. Finally, it 
results in 10,996 observations.   
C. Variable Measurement 
1. Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable can be defined as a variable which is affected 
by other variables. This study used Bank Performance and Risk Taking as 
dependent variables. Bank performance is measured by Return on Asset 
(ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE). Return on Asset (ROA) refers to the 
measurement of the bank's efficiency and effectiveness in generating 
profits through the utilization of the assets owned. Return on Equity 
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(ROE) refers to the measurement the bank's ability to generate profits 
through equity capital owned.  Data associated with ROA and ROE are 
obtained from Laporan Bank Umum (LBU) in a monthly dataset.  
1.   
(Source : Brigham and Houston, 2009) 
2.  
 (Source : Brigham and Houston, 2009) 
The second dependent variable is Risk Taking which is 
measured by the value of Z-Score proposed by Boyd and Graham 
(1986), which indicates the probability of failure of a given bank.  The 
higher value of Z-Score indicates the lower probabilities of failure. 
The data needed to calculate the value of Z-Score are obtained from 
Laporan Bank Umum (LBU) in a monthly dataset.  
3.   
 (Source : Boyd and Graham, 1986) 
4.  
(Source : Boyd and Graham, 1986) 
2. Independent Variables 
This study used bank ownership structure as independent variable. The 
ownership structure is divided into five categories: State-owned banks, 
regional development banks, foreign and joint venture banks, domestic 
banks owned by foreign institutions and domestic banks owned by local 
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institutions. Data associated Indonesian Commercial Banks ownership 
structure is obtained from Laporan Bank Umum (LBU) in a monthly 
dataset. The ownership structure variable was analyzed with dummy 
variable.  
3. Control Variable 
Control Variable is an unchangeable variable which is able to impact 
values. The analysis in this study is also considering the characteristics of 
the bank as a control variable, includes: bank size, bank leverage, and loan 
to deposit ratio.  
Table 3.1 
Research Control Variables 
NO CONTROL VARIABLES MEASUREMENT 
1 Bank Size Natural Logarithm of Total Asset (LTA) 
2 EQTA Equity to Total Asset Ratio 
3 Loan to Deposit Ratio (LDR)   Total Credit / Total Deposits  
Sources : Brigham, Houston, 2009 
D. Data Analysis 
Data analysis was needed to test the hypotheses. Data analysis in this 
research performed with several stages:  
1. Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive analysis includes descriptive statistics of the 
characteristics of the sampled banks and the descriptive statistics for the 
variables. Descriptive statistics is used to explain the data distribution of 
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each variable. This consists of measurements such as: mean, median, 
minimum, maximum, and standard deviation. 
2. Classical assumption Tests  
This study includes several classic assumption tests:  
1. Autocorrelation Test  
Autocorrelation test is performed to determine any indication of 
correlation in a time series observations. Autocorrelation test is done 
by calculating the value of Durbin-Watson in every regression model. 
Autocorrelation test criteria used in this study is explained in table 
below: 
 
DURBIN-WATSON SCORE CONCLUSION 
DW < 1.686 Autocorrelation  
DW 1.687-1.851 No Conclusion 
DW 1.852-2.148 No Autocorrelation 
DW 2.149-2.314 No Conclusion 
DW MORE THAN 2.314 Autocorrelation 
2. Multicollinearity Test 
Multicollinearity test is conducted to identify whether there is a strong 
correlation between two or more independent variables or not. When 
the correlation score is 0.90 or above, the variable might suffer the 
multicollinearity problem.  
34 
 
 
 
3. Hypothesis Test  
Hypothesis testing is conducted to identify the effect of banks ownership 
structure on banks performance and banks risk taking. The hypothesis test 
used Panel Least Square method provided by EViews8 for Windows. 
Regression test is conducted with three approaches: common effect, fixed 
effect and random effect. Furthermore, Hausman test is performed to 
select the best model used in conclusion making. To determine whether 
the hypotheses are supported or not, can be seen from the t statistics and 
the p-value of the coefficient of independent variables. It is significant 
when the p-value are less than the significance level which usually 10%, 
5%, or 1%.  
4. Robustness Check  
This study uses two types of robustness check. First, by testing the 
regression model into three testing instruments: common effect, fixed 
effect, and also random effect. Second, by combining the ownership 
structure dummy variables: SOELOC, for the state and regional 
government ownership banks, to identify the government ownership as a 
whole; and VENFOR, for the foreign and joint venture banks to identify 
foreign ownership as a whole. 
The following is to sum up the full model:  
a. Bank Performance = ƒ (State-owned banks, regional development banks, 
foreign and joint venture banks, domestic banks owned by foreign 
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institutions and domestic banks owned by local institutions, bank size, 
bank leverage, and Loan To Deposit Ratio). The logistic regression model 
is specified as :   
 
 
b. Risk Taking  = ƒ (State-owned banks, regional development banks, 
foreign and joint venture banks, domestic banks owned by foreign 
institutions and domestic banks owned by local institutions, bank size, 
bank leverage, and Loan To Deposit Ratio). 
The logistic regression model is specified as:  
 
 
c. This research also developed several models for robustness tests :  
 
 
 
 
Where SOELOC is the composite of state owned banks and regional 
development banks, and VENFOR is the composite of joint venture banks 
and foreign banks.  
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA ANALYSIS 
This research investigates the effect of bank ownership structure on bank 
performance and bank risk taking. Bank ownership structure is divided into five 
comprehensive detailed categories: State-owned banks, regional development 
banks, domestic banks owned by foreign institutions, and domestic banks owned 
by local institutions; Also there are foreign and joint venture banks. The subjects 
of this research are all commercial banks in Indonesia over the period of 2005-
2013. The overall numbers of samples in this study were 110 commercial banks. 
The data needed for this research gathered from Laporan Bank Umum (LBU) for 
the period 2005-2013 in monthly dataset.  
A. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Descriptive statistics is used to explain the data distribution of each 
variable. The descriptive statistics consists of measurements such as: mean, 
median, minimum, maximum, and standard deviation. Table 4.1 below 
presents the descriptive statistics for the variables in this research. The 
dependent variable ROA has a mean of 1.521421, median of 0.956197, with 
the maximum value 17.02348 and the minimum value of -9.668127. Another 
proxy for bank profitability, Return on Equity (ROE) has a mean of 18.70751, 
median of 13.09164, with the maximum value 470.4082 and the minimum 
value of -874.7. The second dependent variable, bank risk taking which 
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measured by two proxies : First,  Z-Score ROA has a mean of 1442.485, 
median of 678.039, with the maximum value of 216580.5 and the minimum 
value of 6.4569; and second, Z-Score ROE has a mean of 314.921, median of 
80.478, with the maximum value of 245589.4 and the minimum value of -
16.493. 
This study also uses three control variables: First LNTA, as a 
measurement of bank size has a mean of 15.91588, median of 15.75541, with 
the maximum value 20.28809 and the minimum value of 11.10509. Second, 
equity-to-total asset (EQTA) has a mean of 11.15929, median of 8.587983, 
with the maximum value 99.04926 and the minimum value of -1.584381. And 
the last, Loan to Deposit (LDR) Ratio has a mean of 85.88932, median of 
79.97784, with the maximum value 726.7294 and the minimum value of 
4.586926.  
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
  OBSERVATION MEAN MEDIAN MAX MIN STDEV 
ROA 6596 1.521421 0.956197 17.02348 -9.668127 2.160081 
ROE 6596 18.70751 13.09164 470.4082 -874.7 30.52736 
Z-ROA 6596 1442.485 678.039 216580.5 6.4569 5274.674 
Z-ROE 6596 314.921 80.478 245589.4 -16.493 4018.873 
SOE 6596 0.05169 0 1 0 0.221433 
LOCAL 6596 0.230594 0 1 0 0.421245 
FOREIGN 6596 0.06413 0 1 0 0.245003 
VENTURE 6596 0.127502 0 1 0 0.333559 
SOELOC 6596 0.282292 0 1 0 0.450149 
VENFOR 6596 0.191631 0 1 0 0.393614 
LNTA 6596 15.91588 15.75541 20.28809 11.10509 1.73599 
EQTA 6596 11.15929 8.587983 99.04926 -1.584381 10.04908 
LDR 6596 85.88932 79.97784 726.7294 4.586926 52.86504 
Source: Processed Data  
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B. CLASSICAL ASSUMPTION TESTS 
This study includes several classic assumption tests:  
1. Autocorrelation Test  
Autocorrelation test is performed to determine any indication of 
correlation in a time series observations. Autocorrelation test is done by 
calculating the value of Durbin-Watson in every regression model: 
Table 4.2 Autocorrelation Test Results 
DURBIN-WATSON SCORE Conclusion 
MODEL 1 0.281 Autocorrelation 
MODEL 2 0.075 Autocorrelation 
MODEL 3 1.552 Autocorrelation 
MODEL 4 1.125 Autocorrelation 
ROBUST 1 0.271 Autocorrelation 
ROBUST 2 0.074 Autocorrelation 
ROBUST 3 1.551 Autocorrelation 
ROBUST 4 1.124 Autocorrelation 
Source: Processed Data  
Autocorrelation normally occurs in the time series data, including the data 
used in this study.  
2. Multicollinearity Test 
Multicollinearity test is conducted to identify whether there is a strong 
correlation between two or more independent variables or not. The table 
below shows the results of multicollinearity test for both regression 
models: 
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Table 4.3 Multicollinearity Test Results I 
  ROE SOE LOCAL FOREIGN VENTURE LNTA EQTA LDR 
ROE 1 
       SOE -0.11461 1 
      LOCAL 0.09893 -0.12805 1 
     FOREIGN 0.19757 -0.06418 -0.14773 1 
    VENTURE 0.03181 -0.08813 -0.20284 -0.10167 1 
   LNTA 0.085716 0.44413 -0.03024 0.111204 0.057519 1 
  EQTA -0.07509 -0.07475 -0.18237 -0.20563 0.008002 -0.42899 1 
 LDR -0.00538 -0.05173 -0.19606 0.199326 0.16873 -0.06309 0.199686 1 
Source: Processed Data  
Table 4.4 Multicollinearity Test Results II 
  ROE SOELOC VENFOR LNTA EQTA LDR 
ROE 1 
     SOELOC 0.03533 1 
    VENFOR 0.15373 -0.30371 1 
   LNTA 0.085716 0.19271 0.11954 1 
  EQTA -0.07509 -0.20743 -0.12575 -0.42899 1 
 LDR -0.00538 -0.20876 0.26506 -0.06309 0.19686 1 
Source: Processed Data  
When the correlation score is 0.90 or above, the variable might be 
suffers the multicollinearity problem. From the table above, it can be 
concluded that this research do not have multicollinearity effect. 
3. Heteroscedasticity Test 
Heteroscedasticity test in this study was not done separately, but rather 
included as a factor considered in the regression test.  
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C. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Hypothesis testing is conducted to identify the effect of banks 
ownership structure on banks performance and banks risk taking. The 
hypothesis test used Panel Least Square method provided by EViews8 for 
Windows. Regression test is conducted with three approaches: common 
effect, fixed effect and random effect. Furthermore, Hausman test is 
performed to select the best model used in conclusion making. For the 
robustness check, this study combined the ownership structure dummy 
variables: SOELOC, for the state and regional government ownership banks, 
to identify the government ownership as a whole; and VENFOR, for the 
foreign and joint venture banks to identify foreign ownership as a whole.  
Table 4.4 below shows the results of regression test, to identify the 
relationship between banks ownership structure and banks profitability as 
measured by Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Assets (ROA). Hausman 
test shows that the best model chosen is Fixed Effect (with the p-value < 
0.05). Regression test results indicate that simultaneously, ownership structure 
affects banks profitability, as showed by the p-value of the F test is 0.000, for 
both profitability proxies. The value of adjusted R-Square is 9.2% for Return 
on Equity (ROE), and 3.3% for Return on Asset (ROA).  Partially, regression 
test showed several results:   
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Table 4.5 Regression Test Results Dependent Variable Profitability 
Dependent Variable PROFITABILITY 
  ROE ROA 
 
FIXED EFFECT FIXED EFFECT 
SOE -3.465*** 1.755* 
 
-32.623 0.110 
LOCAL 17.899*** 14.257*** 
 
17.397 1.185 
FOREIGN 12.183*** 4.916*** 
 
47.959 0.435 
VENTURE 11.412*** 9.790*** 
 
11.513 1.163 
LNTA 7.336*** 7.673*** 
 
4.207 0.203 
EQTA 4.113*** 4.649*** 
 
0.253 0.035 
LDR -5.539*** -1.655* 
 
-0.056 -0.001 
CONS -6.126*** -4.743*** 
  -56.849 -2.455 
 
  
 F-STAT 7.739 33.146 
PROB (F STAT)  0.000 0.000 
R-SQUARED 0.106 0.340 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED 0.092 0.330 
DURBIN-WATSON 0.281 0.075 
Source: Processed Data  
Notes:  
***indicate significant at 1%, 
** indicate significant at 5%, and 
 * indicate significant at 10% 
From the table above, it can be seen that partially, regression test 
showed several results:   
1. State-ownership negatively affects banks profitability as measured by 
Return on Equity, with the p-value 0.0004 (significant at 1%). Coefficient 
value is -32.623, indicating that the increase in state-ownership can lower 
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banks Return on Equity by -32.623. Meanwhile, state-ownership can 
positively affects banks profitability as measured by Return on Asset, with 
the p-value 0.0793 (significant at 10%). Coefficient value is 0.10964, 
indicating that the increase in state-ownership can increase banks Return 
on Asset by 0.10964. State-ownership actually reduce bank's Return on 
Equity and despite the positive impact on ROA, state ownership can only 
increase a small number of Return on Assets.  
2. Regional government ownership positively affects banks profitability as 
measured by Return on Equity, with the p-value 0.0000 (significant at 
1%). Coefficient value is 17.397, indicating that the increase in regional 
government ownership can increase banks Return on Equity by 17.397. 
Meanwhile, regional government ownership can positively affect banks 
profitability as measured by Return on Asset, with the p-value 0.000 
(significant at 1%). Coefficient value is 1.185, indicating that the increase 
in state-ownership can increase banks Return on Asset by 1.185.  
3. Foreign ownership, which is divided into two categories: Foreign banks 
and joint venture banks, positively affects banks profitability, both Return 
on Equity (ROE) and Return on Asset (ROA).  For the Return on Equity, 
foreign banks resulted p-value 0.000 (significant at 1%) with the 
coefficient value 47.959 and the joint venture banks resulted p-value 0.000 
(significant at 1%) with the coefficient value 11.513. Meanwhile, for the 
Return on Asset, foreign banks resulted p-value 0.000 (significant at 1%) 
with the coefficient value 0.435 and the joint venture banks resulted p-
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value 0.000 (significant at 1%) with the coefficient value 1.163. Foreign 
ownership as a whole is the most profitable type of bank ownership.  
Table 4.5 below shows the results of regression test, to test the hypothesis 
related to the relationship between banks ownership structure and banks risk 
taking as measured by the value of Z-Score. The value of Z-Score is 
calculated with two approaches, either with Return on Assets or with Return 
on Equity. Hausman test shows that the best model chosen for Z-Score ROE 
is Random Effect (with the p-value > 0.05) and the best model for the Z-Score 
ROA is Fixed Effect (with the p-value < 0.05). Regression test results indicate 
that simultaneously, ownership structure affects banks risk, as showed by the 
p-value of the F test is 0.000, for both risk proxies. The value of adjusted R-
Square is 3.1% for Z-Score ROE and 3.5% for Z-Score ROA. 
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Table 4.6 Regression Test Results Dependent Variable Risk Taking 
Dependent Variable Z-SCORE 
  Z-ROE Z-ROA 
  RANDOM EFFECT FIXED EFFECT 
SOE 1.0709 -1.59797 
  85.782 -198.5230 
LOCAL -4039 -8.9147*** 
  -35.373 -1183.736 
FOREIGN 2,4191** -0.747268 
  441.499 -185.1281 
VENTURE -1.9933** -1.416469 
  -61.9136 -319.2727 
LNTA -0.778291 -4.1337*** 
  -31.453 -236.1114 
EQTA 3.131*** 2.00738** 
  71.695 56.629 
LDR -3.3241*** -4.9987*** 
  -3.0289 -6.24113 
CONS 0.3138 5.114634*** 
  252.3624 5446.546 
    
 F-STAT 32.08619 3.382 
PROB (F STAT)  0.000 0.000 
R-SQUARED 0.032 0.049 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED 0.031 0.035 
DURBIN-WATSON 1.552 1.125 
Source: Processed Data  
Notes:  
***indicate significant at 1%, 
** indicate significant at 5%, and 
 * indicate significant at 10% 
From the table above, it can be seen that partially, regression test 
showed several results:   
a. State-ownership does not affect bank risk taking, both measured by Z-
Score ROE, and Z-Score ROA.  
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b. Regional government ownership does not affect bank risk taking measured 
by Z-Score ROE, but it negatively affects bank risk taking measured by Z-
Score ROA.  The resulting p-value is 0.000 (significant at 1%), with the 
coefficient value -1183.736, indicating that the increase in regional 
government ownership can lower the value of Z-Score ROA by -1183.736.  
c. Foreign ownership in a form of foreign banks, positively affects bank risk-
taking as measured by Z-Score ROE. The resulting p-value is 0.0156 
(significant at 5%), with the coefficient value 441.499. Meanwhile, foreign 
ownership does not affects bank risk taking as measured by Z-Score ROA. 
In a form of joint venture banks, foreign ownership negatively affects the 
value of Z-Score ROE, with the resulting p-value 0.0463 (significant at 
5%) and coefficient value -61.913.  
D. ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
This study uses two types of robustness check. First, by testing the 
regression model into three testing instruments: common effect, fixed effect, 
and also random effect. Second, by combining the ownership structure 
dummy variables: SOELOC, for the state and regional government ownership 
banks, to identify the government ownership as a whole; and VENFOR, for 
the foreign and joint venture banks to identify foreign ownership as a whole. 
The table below shows the results of the robustness check:  
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Table 4.7 Robustness Check Results Dependent Variable Profitability 
Dependent Variable ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
  ROE ROA 
 
COMMON FIXED RANDOM COMMON FIXED RANDOM 
SOELOC 4.814*** 4.786*** 4.814*** 16.139*** 21.568*** 20.017*** 
 
8.870 8.846 8.870 0.955 1.042 1.016 
VENFOR 14.842*** 15.113*** 14.842*** 8.534*** 13.571*** 11.672*** 
 
25.125 24.770 25.125 0.730 0.963 0.901 
LNTA 4.334*** 3.814*** 4.334*** 9.720*** 9.089*** 9.310*** 
 
1.380 1.198 1.380 0.188 0.138 0.154 
EQTA -1.712* -2.039** -1.712* 9.811*** 9.995*** 9.569*** 
 
-0.073 -0.090 -0.073 0.043 0.033 0.036 
LDR -3.929*** -5.124*** -3.929*** -7.261*** -1.975** -3.347*** 
 
-0.034 -0.052 -0.034 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 
CONS -1.913* -1.092 -1.913* -6.325*** -5.436*** -4.034*** 
  -10.535 -5.895 -10.535 -2.000 -1.389 -1.119 
       F-STAT 50.292 4.379 50.292 99.759 32.074 116.012 
PROB (F STAT)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-SQUARED 0.035 0.062 0.035 0.067 0.329 0.077 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED 0.034 0.048 0.034 0.067 0.318 0.077 
DURBIN-WATSON 0.264 0.271 0.264 0.082 0.074 0.069 
Source: Processed Data  
Notes:  
***indicate significant at 1%, 
** indicate significant at 5%, and 
 * indicate significant at 10% 
Hausman test shows that the best model chosen is Fixed Effect (with 
the p-value < 0.05) for both proxies of banks profitability. Regression test 
results indicate that simultaneously, ownership structure affects banks 
profitability, as showed by the p-value of the F test is 0.000, for both ROE and 
ROA. The value of adjusted R-Square is 4.8% for Return on Equity (ROE), 
and 3.18 % for Return on Asset (ROA).   
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Partially, government ownership as a whole, positively affects banks 
profitability, both ROE and ROA. For the Return on Equity, government 
banks resulted p-value 0.000 (significant at 1%) with the coefficient value 
8.8457. Thus, it can be concluded that the increase in government ownership 
as a whole can improve ROE by 8.8457. For the Return on Asset, government 
banks resulted p-value 0.000 (significant at 1%) with the coefficient value 
1.0424.  This shows that the increase in government ownership as a whole can 
improve ROA by 1.0424. 
Foreign ownership as a whole positively affects banks profitability for 
both proxies. For the Return on Equity, foreign banks resulted p-value 0.000 
(significant at 1%) with the coefficient value 24.7699. Thus, it can be 
concluded that the increase in government ownership as a whole can improve 
ROE by 24.7699. For the Return on Asset, foreign banks resulted p-value 
0.000 (significant at 1%) with the coefficient value 0.9634. Generally, it can 
be concluded that foreign banks are more profitable than government banks.  
The table below shows the robustness check results for dependent 
variable Risk Taking. Hausman test shows that the best model chosen for Z-
Score ROE is Random Effect (with the p-value > 0.05) and the chosen model 
for Z-Score ROA is Fixed Effect (with the p-value < 0.05). Regression test 
results indicate that simultaneously, ownership structure affects banks risk 
taking, as showed by the p-value of the F test is 0.000, for both proxies. The 
value of adjusted R-Square is 2.2% for Z-Score ROE and 3 % for Z-Score 
ROA.  
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Table 4.8 Robustness Check Results Dependent Variable Risk Taking 
Dependent Variable ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
  Z-SCORE ROE Z-SCORE ROA 
 
COMMON FIXED RANDOM COMMON FIXED RANDOM 
SOELOC -0.3607 -0.400 -0.3608 -9.715*** -9.642*** -9.717*** 
 
-24.510 -27.374 -24.510 -1045.99 -1042.53 -1045.08 
VENFOR 1.3303 1.28743 1.3304 -1.8427* -1.657* -1.794* 
 
87.337 87.9324 87.337 -331.199 -307.105 -324.734 
LNTA -0.7535 -0.9263 -0.7535 -3.3127*** -3.844*** -3.447*** 
 
-23.0333 -28.963 -24.033 -149.24 -176.325 -155.38 
EQTA 3.1851*** 3.140*** 3.185*** 2.3299** 2.216** 2.312** 
 
70.2851 70.672 70.285 61.607 59.925 61.246 
LDR -3.3238*** -3.281*** -3.324*** -4.979*** -4.953*** -5.019*** 
 
-2.8226 -3.3157 -2.823 -5.213 -6.042 -5.401 
CONS 0.2094 0.397 0.2094 4.297*** 5.0464*** 4.425*** 
  139.475 256.519 139.475 3945.62 4460.14 4058.50 
       F-STAT 43.967 2.785 43.967 41.08 3.376 41.48 
PROB (F STAT)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-SQUARED 0.032 0.041 0.032 0.029 0.049 0.030 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED 0.031 0.027 0.031 0.028 0.034 0.029 
DURBIN-WATSON 1.551 1.553 1.551 1.112 1.124 1.112 
Source: Processed Data  
Notes:  
***indicate significant at 1%, 
** indicate significant at 5%, and * indicate significant at 10% 
 
Partially, government ownership as a whole, does not affect banks risk 
taking measured by the value of Z-Score ROE, but government ownership can 
negatively affect banks risk taking as measured by Z-Score ROA. The 
resulting p-value is 0.000 (significant at 1%) with the coefficient value -
1042.532. Meanwhile, foreign ownership as a whole does not affect banks 
risk taking measured by the value of Z-Score ROE, but it can negatively affect 
banks risk taking as measured by Z-Score ROA. The resulting p-value is 
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0.0976 (significant at 10%) with the coefficient value -307.105. In general, it 
can be concluded that in terms of bank risk taking, although both types of 
ownership lower the value of the Z-Score, government banks are riskier than 
foreign bank.  
E. DISCUSSION 
1. State-Owned Banks 
Regression test results indicate that state-ownership negatively affects 
banks profitability as measured by Return on Equity, with the p-value 
0.0004 (significant at 1%) and the resulted coefficient value is -32.623, 
indicating that the increase in state-ownership can lower banks Return on 
Equity by -32.623. This result is consistent with previous studies 
conducted by Linqiang Huang and Sheng Xiao (2012) which stated that 
the profitability of the firm, as measured by Return on Sales (ROS) is 
negatively affected by the government ownership. These results are also in 
line with another prior study conducted by Alejandro Micco (2007) which 
concluded that state-owned bank located in developing countries tend to 
have profitability much lower than domestic privately owned bank. 
Regarding with bank risk taking, State-ownership does not affect bank 
risk taking, both measured by Z-Score ROE, and Z-Score ROA.  
2. Regional Development Banks 
From the hypothesis test we can conclude that regional government 
ownership positively affects banks profitability as measured by Return on 
Equity (ROE), with the p-value 0.0000 (significant at 1%) and the resulted 
50 
 
 
 
coefficient value is 17.397. Meanwhile, regional government ownership 
also positively affects banks profitability as measured by Return on Asset, 
with the p-value 0.000 (significant at 1%) and the resulted coefficient 
value is 1.185. Although both are involving government ownership, 
regional development bank is more profitable than stated-owned bank. 
Regarding with bank risk taking as measured with the value of Z-
Score (Boyd and Graham, 1986), regional government ownership does not 
affect bank risk taking measured by Z-Score ROE, but it negatively affects 
bank risk taking measured by Z-Score ROA.  The resulting p-value is 
0.000 (significant at 1%), with the coefficient value -1183.736, indicating 
that the increase in regional government ownership can lower the value of 
Z-Score ROA by -1183.736.  
3. Foreign Banks 
Foreign ownership, which is divided into two categories: Foreign 
banks and joint venture banks, positively affects banks profitability, both 
Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Asset (ROA).  For the Return on 
Equity, foreign banks resulted p-value 0.000 (significant at 1%) with the 
coefficient value 47.959 and the joint venture banks resulted p-value 0.000 
(significant at 1%) with the coefficient value 11.513. Meanwhile, for the 
Return on Asset, foreign banks resulted p-value 0.000 (significant at 1%) 
with the coefficient value 0.435 and the joint venture banks resulted p-
value 0.000 (significant at 1%) with the coefficient value 1.163. Foreign 
ownership as a whole is the most profitable type of bank ownership.  
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This results were supported by previous study conducted by Alejandro 
Micco (2007), which concluded that foreign bank located in developed 
countries tend to be more profitable than private domestic bank.  Previous 
study by Allen et al. (2009) also stated that foreign banks have the highest 
level of profit efficiency followed by private domestic banks in the second 
rank. ). In line with this research, study conducted by Enrica and Poonam 
(2006) also concluded that foreign banks performed significantly better (in 
terms of profitability and Net Interest Margin) than domestic banks. 
Concerning with bank risk taking, foreign ownership in a form of 
foreign banks, positively affects bank risk-taking as measured by Z-Score 
ROE. The resulting p-value is 0.0156 (significant at 5%), with the 
coefficient value 441.499. Meanwhile, foreign ownership does not affects 
bank risk taking as measured by Z-Score ROA. In a form of joint venture 
banks, foreign ownership negatively affects the value of Z-Score ROE, 
with the resulting p-value 0.0463 (significant at 5%) and coefficient value 
-61.913.  
Through these results, we can conclude that in terms of bank risk 
taking, foreign ownership is the best type of ownership among all types of 
bank ownership structures. This result is supported by previous study 
conducted by Enrica and Poonam (2006), which stated that foreign banks 
performed significantly better than domestic banks because foreign banks 
tend to implement more sophisticated risk management technique and 
better system of internal control. In line with these results, another prior 
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study conducted by Boubakri (2005) also stated that associated with bank 
risk-taking, risk in foreign-owned banks is lower than domestic private 
banks. 
4. Robustness Check 
Robustness check results show that government ownership as a whole, 
does not affect banks risk taking measured by the value of Z-Score ROE, 
but government ownership can negatively affect banks risk taking as 
measured by Z-Score ROA. The resulting p-value is 0.000 (significant at 
1%) with the coefficient value -1042.532. Meanwhile, foreign ownership 
as a whole does not affect banks risk taking measured by the value of Z-
Score ROE, but it can negatively affect banks risk taking as measured by 
Z-Score ROA. The resulting p-value is 0.0976 (significant at 10%) with 
the coefficient value -307.105. In general, it can be concluded that in 
terms of bank risk taking, although both types of ownership lower the 
value of the Z-Score, government banks are riskier than foreign bank. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION, LIMITATION, AND SUGGESTION 
After presenting the data analysis and also the results of this study in the previous 
section, several conclusions of this study and its contribution to the literature and 
managerial practice will be provided in this chapter. Furthermore, a study limitation 
and future research suggestions will also be indicated in the last section.  
A. CONCLUSION 
Based on the statistical analysis results regarding the effect of bank ownership 
structure on bank performance and bank risk taking, several following 
conclusions can be drawn: 
1. Regression test results indicate that state-ownership negatively affects 
banks profitability as measured by Return on Equity. Regarding with bank 
risk taking, State-ownership does not affect bank risk taking, both 
measured by Z-Score ROE, and  Z-Score ROA.   
2. From the hypothesis test we can conclude that regional government 
ownership positively affects banks profitability as measured by Return on 
Equity (ROE). Meanwhile, regional government ownership also positively 
affects banks profitability as measured by Return on Asset. Although both 
are involving government ownership, from the coefficient value, can be 
concluded that regional development bank is more profitable than stated-
owned bank. Regarding with bank risk-taking, regional government 
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ownership does not affect bank risk taking measured by Z-Score ROE, but 
it negatively affects bank risk taking measured by Z-Score ROA.  
3. Foreign ownership, which is divided into two categories: Foreign banks 
and joint venture banks, positively affects banks profitability, both Return 
on Equity (ROE) and Return on Asset (ROA).  From the regression 
results, can be concluded that foreign ownership as a whole is the most 
profitable type of bank ownership.  
4. Concerning with bank risk taking, foreign ownership in a form of foreign 
banks, positively affects bank risk-taking as measured by Z-Score ROE. 
Meanwhile, foreign ownership does not affect bank risk taking as 
measured by Z-Score ROA. In a form of joint venture banks, foreign 
ownership negatively affects the value of Z-Score ROE. Through these 
results, we can conclude that in terms of bank risk taking, foreign 
ownership is the best type of ownership among all types of bank 
ownership structures.  
5. Robustness test have also been performed in this study : 
First, in terms of bank profitability, government ownership as a whole, 
positively affects banks profitability, both ROE and ROA. Foreign 
ownership as a whole also positively affects banks profitability for both 
proxies. Generally, from the coefficient value, it can be concluded that 
foreign banks are more profitable than government banks.  
Second, in terms of bank risk taking, government ownership as a 
whole, does not affect banks risk taking measured by the value of Z-Score 
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ROE, but government ownership can negatively affect banks risk taking 
as measured by Z-Score ROA. Meanwhile, foreign ownership as a whole 
does not affect banks risk taking measured by the value of Z-Score ROE, 
but it can negatively affect banks risk taking as measured by Z-Score 
ROA. In general, it can be concluded that in terms of bank risk taking, 
although both types of ownership lower the value of the Z-Score, a foreign 
bank is better than government banks 
B. LIMITATION AND SUGGESTION 
The current study serves as a valuable discussion on how bank 
ownership structure affects bank performance and bank risk-taking. However, 
as like other research that not all variables can be included, this study is 
subject to a number of potential limitations. First, related to the availability of 
data. Observations in this study conducted in the monthly period, however 
some banks do not provide the data needed in full, especially in monthly 
dataset. Thus, researchers (and also future researchers) can use the long period 
of observation for more robust research results. Second, regarding the 
research related to state-owned banks, Paolo Sapienza (2004) argued that 
profitability is not enough be used as a measurement of the success of banks, 
because in addition to gain profit, state-owned banks aim to maximize broader 
social objectives. Hence, further research needs to consider various aspects in 
measuring the performance of state-owned banks.  
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APPENDIX A 
INDONESIAN BANKS OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES 
a. State-Owned Banks 
NO BANK NAME 
1 PT BANK RAKYAT INDONESIA (PERSERO), Tbk 
2 PT BANK MANDIRI (PERSERO), Tbk 
3 PT BANK NEGARA INDONESIA (PERSERO), Tbk 
4 PT BANK TABUNGAN NEGARA (PERSERO), Tbk 
a. Regional Development Banks 
NO BANK NAME 
5 PT BPD JAWA BARAT DAN BANTEN, Tbk 
6 PT BPD DKI 
7 BPD YOGYAKARTA 
8 PT BPD JAWA TENGAH 
9 PT BPD JAWA TIMUR 
10 PT BPD JAMBI 
11 PT BANK ACEH 
12 PT BPD SUMATERA UTARA 
13 PT BPD SUMATERA BARAT 
14 PT BPD RIAU DAN KEPULAUAN RIAU 
15 PT BPD SUMATERA SELATAN DAN BANGKA BELITUNG 
16 PT BPD LAMPUNG 
17 PT BPD KALIMANTAN SELATAN 
18 PT. BPD KALIMANTAN BARAT 
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19 BPD KALIMANTAN TIMUR 
20 PT.  BPD KALIMANTAN TENGAH 
21 PT. BPD SULAWESI SELATAN DAN SULAWESI BARAT 
22 PT. BPD SULAWESI UTARA 
23 PT. BPD NUSA TENGGARA BARAT 
24 PT BPD BALI 
25 PT BPD NUSA TENGGARA TIMUR 
26 PT BPD MALUKU 
27 PT BPD PAPUA 
28 PT BPD BENGKULU 
29 PT BPD SULAWESI TENGAH 
30 BPD SULAWESI TENGGARA 
b. Foreign Banks 
NO BANK NAME 
31 CITIBANK N.A. 
32 JP. MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. 
33 BANK OF AMERICA, N.A 
34 THE BANGKOK BANK COMP. LTD 
35 THE HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORP 
36 THE BANK OF TOKYO MITSUBISHI UFJ LTD 
37 STANDARD CHARTERED BANK 
38 THE ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND N.V. 
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39 DEUTSCHE BANK AG. 
40 BANK OF CHINA 
c. Joint Venture Banks 
NO BANK NAME 
41 PT BANK UOB INDONESIA 
42 PT BANK SUMITOMO MITSUI INDONESIA 
43 PT BANK DBS INDONESIA 
44 PT BANK RESONA PERDANIA 
45 PT BANK MIZUHO INDONESIA 
46 PT BANK CAPITAL INDONESIA, Tbk 
47 PT BANK BNP PARIBAS INDONESIA 
48 PT BANK KEB INDONESIA 
49 PT BANK ANZ INDONESIA 
50 PT BANK WOORI INDONESIA 
51 PT BANK RABOBANK INTERNATIONAL INDONESIA 
52 PT BANK AGRIS 
53 PT BANK CHINA TRUST INDONESIA 
54 PT BANK COMMONWEALTH 
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d. De Novo Banks 
NO BANK NAME 
55 PT BANK DANAMON INDONESIA, Tbk 
56 PT BANK PERMATA, Tbk 
57 PT BANK CENTRAL ASIA, Tbk 
58 PT BANK INTERNASIONAL INDONESIA, Tbk 
59 PT BANK CIMB NIAGA, Tbk 
60 PT BANK EKONOMI RAHARJA, Tbk 
61 PT BANK NUSANTARA PARAHYANGAN,Tbk 
62 PT BANK OF INDIA INDONESIA, Tbk 
63 PT BANK QNB KESAWAN, Tbk 
64 PT BANK TABUNGAN PENSIUNAN NASIONAL, Tbk 
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APPENDIX B 
DATA ANALYSIS RESULTS 
 
1. MODEL 1 
 
 
 
COMMON EFFECT 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 02/03/17   Time: 05:31   
Sample: 2005M09 2013M12   
Periods included: 100   
Cross-sections included: 110   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 6919  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SOE 0.440582 0.127912 3.444419 0.0006 
LOCAL 1.017239 0.059078 17.21855 0.0000 
FOREIG -0.114875 0.071365 -1.609669 0.1075 
VENT 1.110783 0.109399 10.15349 0.0000 
LNTA 0.220852 0.023050 9.581282 0.0000 
EQTA 0.039545 0.004250 9.304398 0.0000 
LDR -0.003014 0.000517 -5.829624 0.0000 
C -2.509472 0.375425 -6.684355 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.081878    Mean dependent var 1.564191 
Adjusted R-squared 0.080948    S.D. dependent var 2.278151 
S.E. of regression 2.183999    Akaike info criterion 4.401348 
Sum squared resid 32964.45    Schwarz criterion 4.409259 
Log likelihood -15218.46    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.404076 
F-statistic 88.04624    Durbin-Watson stat 0.083810 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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FIXED EFFECT 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 02/03/17   Time: 05:35   
Sample: 2005M09 2013M12   
Periods included: 100   
Cross-sections included: 110   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 6919  
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
WARNING: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SOE 0.109647 0.062475 1.755061 0.0793 
LOCAL 1.184705 0.083094 14.25748 0.0000 
FOREIG 0.434977 0.088490 4.915529 0.0000 
VENT 1.162901 0.118791 9.789514 0.0000 
LNTA 0.203441 0.026514 7.672973 0.0000 
EQTA 0.034546 0.007431 4.649026 0.0000 
LDR -0.000560 0.000338 -1.654820 0.0980 
C -2.454528 0.517539 -4.742696 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.340271    Mean dependent var 1.564191 
Adjusted R-squared 0.330005    S.D. dependent var 2.278151 
S.E. of regression 1.864740    Akaike info criterion 4.099465 
Sum squared resid 23687.07    Schwarz criterion 4.205274 
Log likelihood -14075.10    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.135946 
F-statistic 33.14572    Durbin-Watson stat 0.074788 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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RANDOM EFFECT 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel EGLS (Period random effects)  
Date: 02/03/17   Time: 05:36   
Sample: 2005M09 2013M12   
Periods included: 100   
Cross-sections included: 110   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 6919  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SOE 0.234728 0.061342 3.826567 0.0001 
LOCAL 1.116751 0.079845 13.98656 0.0000 
FOREIG 0.221784 0.072285 3.068187 0.0022 
VENT 1.146233 0.117988 9.714836 0.0000 
LNTA 0.212106 0.030053 7.057729 0.0000 
EQTA 0.036398 0.007383 4.929910 0.0000 
LDR -0.001541 0.000336 -4.583825 0.0000 
C -2.110500 0.484389 -4.357032 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     Period random  0.331267 0.0306 
Idiosyncratic random 1.864740 0.9694 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.089792    Mean dependent var 0.929757 
Adjusted R-squared 0.088870    S.D. dependent var 2.134735 
S.E. of regression 1.978616    Sum squared resid 27056.03 
F-statistic 97.39554    Durbin-Watson stat 0.070977 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.048361    Mean dependent var 1.564191 
Sum squared resid 34167.88    Durbin-Watson stat 0.080688 
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HAUSMAN TEST 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test period random effects   
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Period random 879.699836 7 0.0000 
     
          
Period random effects test comparisons:  
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     SOE 0.109647 0.234728 0.000053 0.0000 
LOCAL 1.184705 1.116751 0.000010 0.0000 
FOREIG 0.434977 0.221784 0.000069 0.0000 
VENT 1.162901 1.146233 0.000005 0.0000 
LNTA 0.203441 0.212106 0.000005 0.0001 
EQTA 0.034546 0.036398 0.000000 0.0000 
LDR -0.000560 -0.001541 0.000000 0.0000 
     
          
Period random effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 02/03/17   Time: 05:38   
Sample: 2005M09 2013M12   
Periods included: 100   
Cross-sections included: 110   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 6919  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -2.454528 0.277236 -8.853567 0.0000 
SOE 0.109647 0.120152 0.912573 0.3615 
LOCAL 1.184705 0.058299 20.32103 0.0000 
FOREIG 0.434977 0.097518 4.460459 0.0000 
VENT 1.162901 0.072677 16.00102 0.0000 
LNTA 0.203441 0.016609 12.24862 0.0000 
EQTA 0.034546 0.002676 12.91155 0.0000 
LDR -0.000560 0.000471 -1.189043 0.2345 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.340271    Mean dependent var 1.564191 
Adjusted R-squared 0.330005    S.D. dependent var 2.278151 
S.E. of regression 1.864740    Akaike info criterion 4.099465 
Sum squared resid 23687.07    Schwarz criterion 4.205274 
Log likelihood -14075.10    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.135946 
F-statistic 33.14572    Durbin-Watson stat 0.074788 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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UJI MULTIKOLINIERITAS 
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary        
Date: 02/03/17   Time: 05:42        
Sample: 2005M09 2013M12        
Included observations: 6919        
Balanced sample (listwise missing value deletion)       
          
          Correlation         
Probability ROA  SOE  LOCAL  FOREIG  VENT  LNTA  EQTA  LDR   
ROA  1.000000         
 -----          
          
SOE  0.072819 1.000000        
 0.0000 -----         
          
LOCAL  0.128503 -0.125909 1.000000       
 0.0000 0.0000 -----        
          
FOREIG  -0.090828 -0.063114 -0.150049 1.000000      
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----       
          
VENT  0.119635 -0.086701 -0.206126 -0.103323 1.000000     
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----      
          
LNTA  0.121206 0.448694 -0.028238 0.112390 0.058426 1.000000    
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0188 0.0000 0.0000 -----     
          
EQTA  0.054979 -0.070496 -0.184102 -0.208000 0.008685 -0.424032 1.000000   
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4701 0.0000 -----    
          
LDR  -0.060651 -0.055481 -0.200196 0.192210 0.166985 -0.064263 0.200163 1.000000  
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----   
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2.  MODEL 2 
 
 
 
COMMON EFFECT 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ROE   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 02/03/17   Time: 05:46   
Sample: 2005M09 2013M12   
Periods included: 100   
Cross-sections included: 110   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 7020  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SOE -34.91916 9.833694 -3.550970 0.0004 
LOCAL 17.65290 1.032951 17.08977 0.0000 
FOREIG 47.98128 3.954481 12.13340 0.0000 
VENT 11.37340 1.004632 11.32096 0.0000 
LNTA 4.604634 0.550796 8.359965 0.0000 
EQTA 0.291852 0.060801 4.800088 0.0000 
LDR -0.044345 0.009664 -4.588657 0.0000 
C -64.52084 9.154059 -7.048331 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.082891    Mean dependent var 14.91603 
Adjusted R-squared 0.081975    S.D. dependent var 55.81587 
S.E. of regression 53.47920    Akaike info criterion 10.79760 
Sum squared resid 20054497    Schwarz criterion 10.80542 
Log likelihood -37891.58    Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.80029 
F-statistic 90.53731    Durbin-Watson stat 0.275695 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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FIXED EFFECT 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ROE   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 02/03/17   Time: 05:47   
Sample: 2005M09 2013M12   
Periods included: 100   
Cross-sections included: 110   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 7020  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SOE -32.62341 9.415665 -3.464802 0.0005 
LOCAL 17.39728 0.971990 17.89862 0.0000 
FOREIG 47.95872 3.936558 12.18291 0.0000 
VENT 11.51349 1.008867 11.41230 0.0000 
LNTA 4.207000 0.573462 7.336145 0.0000 
EQTA 0.252622 0.061420 4.113018 0.0000 
LDR -0.056094 0.010128 -5.538722 0.0000 
C -56.84867 9.279308 -6.126391 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.106072    Mean dependent var 14.91603 
Adjusted R-squared 0.092365    S.D. dependent var 55.81587 
S.E. of regression 53.17570    Akaike info criterion 10.80020 
Sum squared resid 19547578    Schwarz criterion 10.90471 
Log likelihood -37801.72    Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.83621 
F-statistic 7.738566    Durbin-Watson stat 0.281389 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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RANDOM EFFECT 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ROE   
Method: Panel EGLS (Period random effects)  
Date: 02/03/17   Time: 05:48   
Sample: 2005M09 2013M12   
Periods included: 100   
Cross-sections included: 110   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 7020  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SOE -34.91916 9.833694 -3.550970 0.0004 
LOCAL 17.65290 1.032951 17.08977 0.0000 
FOREIG 47.98128 3.954481 12.13340 0.0000 
VENT 11.37340 1.004632 11.32096 0.0000 
LNTA 4.604634 0.550796 8.359965 0.0000 
EQTA 0.291852 0.060801 4.800088 0.0000 
LDR -0.044345 0.009664 -4.588657 0.0000 
C -64.52084 9.154059 -7.048331 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     Period random  0.000000 0.0000 
Idiosyncratic random 53.17570 1.0000 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.082891    Mean dependent var 14.91603 
Adjusted R-squared 0.081975    S.D. dependent var 55.81587 
S.E. of regression 53.47920    Sum squared resid 20054497 
F-statistic 90.53731    Durbin-Watson stat 0.275695 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.082891    Mean dependent var 14.91603 
Sum squared resid 20054497    Durbin-Watson stat 0.275695 
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HAUSMAN TEST 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test period random effects   
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Period random 123.555871 7 0.0000 
     
     ** WARNING: estimated period random effects variance is zero. 
     
Period random effects test comparisons:  
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     SOE -32.623413 -34.919156 0.124062 0.0000 
LOCAL 17.397281 17.652901 0.022284 0.0868 
FOREIG 47.958721 47.981279 0.149389 0.9535 
VENT 11.513491 11.373396 0.010096 0.1632 
LNTA 4.207000 4.604634 0.010010 0.0001 
EQTA 0.252622 0.291852 0.000053 0.0000 
LDR -0.056094 -0.044345 0.000006 0.0000 
     
          
Period random effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: ROE   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 02/03/17   Time: 05:49   
Sample: 2005M09 2013M12   
Periods included: 100   
Cross-sections included: 110   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 7020  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -56.84867 7.845319 -7.246189 0.0000 
SOE -32.62341 3.318640 -9.830355 0.0000 
LOCAL 17.39728 1.655407 10.50937 0.0000 
FOREIG 47.95872 2.776625 17.27231 0.0000 
VENT 11.51349 2.068915 5.564991 0.0000 
LNTA 4.207000 0.469411 8.962292 0.0000 
EQTA 0.252622 0.075438 3.348717 0.0008 
LDR -0.056094 0.013384 -4.191085 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.106072    Mean dependent var 14.91603 
Adjusted R-squared 0.092365    S.D. dependent var 55.81587 
S.E. of regression 53.17570    Akaike info criterion 10.80020 
Sum squared resid 19547578    Schwarz criterion 10.90471 
Log likelihood -37801.72    Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.83621 
F-statistic 7.738566    Durbin-Watson stat 0.281389 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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UJI MULTIKOLINIERITAS 
 
 
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary        
Date: 02/03/17   Time: 08:20        
Sample: 2005M09 2013M12        
Included observations: 7020        
Balanced sample (listwise missing value deletion)       
          
          Correlation         
Probability ROE  SOE  LOCAL  FOREIG  VENT  LNTA  EQTA  LDR   
ROE  1.000000         
 -----          
          
SOE  -0.114611 1.000000        
 0.0000 -----         
          
LOCAL  0.098932 -0.128056 1.000000       
 0.0000 0.0000 -----        
          
FOREIG  0.197574 -0.064188 -0.147732 1.000000      
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----       
          
VENT  0.031810 -0.088135 -0.202846 -0.101678 1.000000     
 0.0077 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----      
          
LNTA  0.085716 0.444136 -0.030242 0.111204 0.057519 1.000000    
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0113 0.0000 0.0000 -----     
          
EQTA  -0.075093 -0.074750 -0.182365 -0.205632 0.008002 -0.428994 1.000000   
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5026 0.0000 -----    
          
LDR  -0.005383 -0.051730 -0.196062 0.193260 0.168731 -0.063098 0.196866 1.000000  
 0.6520 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----   
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3 MODEL 3 
.  
 
COMMON EFFECT 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ZROA   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 04/08/17   Time: 06:33   
Sample (adjusted): 2005M11 2013M12  
Periods included: 98   
Cross-sections included: 110   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 6807  
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SOE -335.1519 114.8261 -2.918777 0.0035 
LOCAL -1164.337 134.1178 -8.681449 0.0000 
FOREIG -213.8540 246.3730 -0.868009 0.3854 
VENT -347.7715 218.4239 -1.592187 0.1114 
LNTA -198.9152 57.00862 -3.489212 0.0005 
EQTA 58.88419 27.81809 2.116759 0.0343 
LDR -5.339616 1.077702 -4.954632 0.0000 
C 4761.189 1117.346 4.261161 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.030041    Mean dependent var 1453.144 
Adjusted R-squared 0.029042    S.D. dependent var 5671.805 
S.E. of regression 5588.837    Akaike info criterion 20.09610 
Sum squared resid 2.12E+11    Schwarz criterion 20.10413 
Log likelihood -68389.09    Hannan-Quinn criter. 20.09887 
F-statistic 30.08217    Durbin-Watson stat 1.112935 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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FIXED EFFECT 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ZROA   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 04/08/17   Time: 06:34   
Sample (adjusted): 2005M11 2013M12  
Periods included: 98   
Cross-sections included: 110   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 6807  
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SOE -198.5230 124.2352 -1.597962 0.1101 
LOCAL -1183.736 132.7848 -8.914701 0.0000 
FOREIG -185.1281 247.7399 -0.747268 0.4549 
VENT -319.2727 225.4004 -1.416469 0.1567 
LNTA -236.1114 57.11902 -4.133673 0.0000 
EQTA 56.62949 28.21062 2.007382 0.0447 
LDR -6.241133 1.248527 -4.998797 0.0000 
C 5446.546 1064.895 5.114634 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.049868    Mean dependent var 1453.144 
Adjusted R-squared 0.035124    S.D. dependent var 5671.805 
S.E. of regression 5571.307    Akaike info criterion 20.10395 
Sum squared resid 2.08E+11    Schwarz criterion 20.20924 
Log likelihood -68318.80    Hannan-Quinn criter. 20.14028 
F-statistic 3.382248    Durbin-Watson stat 1.125356 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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RANDOM EFFECT 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ZROA   
Method: Panel EGLS (Period random effects)  
Date: 04/08/17   Time: 06:35   
Sample (adjusted): 2005M11 2013M12  
Periods included: 98   
Cross-sections included: 110   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 6807  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SOE -305.4619 115.4969 -2.644763 0.0082 
LOCAL -1168.237 133.6464 -8.741251 0.0000 
FOREIG -204.6624 247.2963 -0.827600 0.4079 
VENT -340.6741 219.5710 -1.551544 0.1208 
LNTA -207.3995 56.92989 -3.643069 0.0003 
EQTA 58.39151 27.83794 2.097552 0.0360 
LDR -5.545252 1.107670 -5.006231 0.0000 
C 4912.933 1113.670 4.411480 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     Period random  297.4659 0.0028 
Idiosyncratic random 5571.307 0.9972 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.030388    Mean dependent var 1298.680 
Adjusted R-squared 0.029390    S.D. dependent var 5662.430 
S.E. of regression 5578.371    Sum squared resid 2.12E+11 
F-statistic 30.44055    Durbin-Watson stat 1.113201 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.030033    Mean dependent var 1453.144 
Sum squared resid 2.12E+11    Durbin-Watson stat 1.112933 
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HAUSMAN TEST 
 
 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test period random effects   
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Period random 23.843685 7 0.0012 
     
          
Period random effects test comparisons:  
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     SOE -198.523034 -305.461936 997.553874 0.0007 
LOCAL 
-
1183.736380 -1168.237055 200.594431 0.2738 
FOREIG -185.128089 -204.662387 1363.621018 0.5968 
VENT -319.272672 -340.674059 94.298922 0.0275 
LNTA -236.111356 -207.399532 87.245826 0.0021 
EQTA 56.629495 58.391514 0.401285 0.0054 
LDR -6.241133 -5.545252 0.050674 0.0020 
     
          
Period random effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: ZROA   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 04/08/17   Time: 06:35   
Sample (adjusted): 2005M11 2013M12  
Periods included: 98   
Cross-sections included: 110   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 6807  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 5446.546 837.9095 6.500160 0.0000 
SOE -198.5230 362.1041 -0.548249 0.5835 
LOCAL -1183.736 175.8351 -6.732084 0.0000 
FOREIG -185.1281 292.0131 -0.633972 0.5261 
VENT -319.2727 218.3050 -1.462508 0.1436 
LNTA -236.1114 50.17362 -4.705886 0.0000 
EQTA 56.62949 8.060294 7.025735 0.0000 
LDR -6.241133 1.410553 -4.424600 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.049868    Mean dependent var 1453.144 
Adjusted R-squared 0.035124    S.D. dependent var 5671.805 
S.E. of regression 5571.307    Akaike info criterion 20.10395 
Sum squared resid 2.08E+11    Schwarz criterion 20.20924 
Log likelihood -68318.80    Hannan-Quinn criter. 20.14028 
F-statistic 3.382248    Durbin-Watson stat 1.125356 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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UJI MULTIKOLINIERITAS 
 
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary        
Date: 04/08/17   Time: 06:38        
Sample (adjusted): 2005M11 2013M12        
Included observations: 6807 after adjustments       
Balanced sample (listwise missing value deletion)       
          
          Correlation         
Probability ZROA  SOE  LOCAL  FOREIG  VENT  LNTA  EQTA  LDR   
ZROA  1.000000         
 -----          
          
SOE  -0.031589 1.000000        
 0.0091 -----         
          
LOCAL  -0.086951 -0.125776 1.000000       
 0.0000 0.0000 -----        
          
FOREIG  -0.031684 -0.063563 -0.151129 1.000000      
 0.0089 0.0000 0.0000 -----       
          
VENT  -0.010975 -0.086998 -0.206846 -0.104534 1.000000     
 0.3653 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----      
          
LNTA  -0.107707 0.449289 -0.025377 0.111018 0.056229 1.000000    
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0363 0.0000 0.0000 -----     
          
EQTA  0.138910 -0.070286 -0.185162 -0.208949 0.008822 -0.425963 1.000000   
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4668 0.0000 -----    
          
LDR  -0.011431 -0.055100 -0.201220 0.191988 0.165927 -0.067318 0.201389 1.000000  
 0.3457 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----   
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4. MODEL 4 
 
 
COMMON EFFECT 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ZROE   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 04/08/17   Time: 06:39   
Sample (adjusted): 2005M11 2013M12  
Periods included: 98   
Cross-sections included: 109   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 6685  
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SOE 85.78230 80.10555 1.070866 0.2843 
LOCAL -35.37326 87.57576 -0.403916 0.6863 
FOREIG 441.4999 182.5013 2.419159 0.0156 
VENT -61.91316 31.06008 -1.993336 0.0463 
LNTA -31.45292 40.41282 -0.778291 0.4364 
EQTA 71.69503 22.89445 3.131546 0.0017 
LDR -3.028935 0.911183 -3.324178 0.0009 
C 252.3624 804.2631 0.313781 0.7537 
     
     R-squared 0.032544    Mean dependent var 310.6696 
Adjusted R-squared 0.031529    S.D. dependent var 3992.825 
S.E. of regression 3929.375    Akaike info criterion 19.39154 
Sum squared resid 1.03E+11    Schwarz criterion 19.39969 
Log likelihood -64808.24    Hannan-Quinn criter. 19.39436 
F-statistic 32.08619    Durbin-Watson stat 1.552159 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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FIXED EFFECT 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ZROE   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 04/08/17   Time: 06:40   
Sample (adjusted): 2005M11 2013M12  
Periods included: 98   
Cross-sections included: 109   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 6685  
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
WARNING: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SOE 147.1550 93.53730 1.573222 0.1157 
LOCAL -48.99209 87.56276 -0.559508 0.5758 
FOREIG 436.6229 179.4491 2.433129 0.0150 
VENT -52.36990 34.47856 -1.518912 0.1288 
LNTA -42.24877 39.87978 -1.059403 0.2895 
EQTA 71.64262 23.16919 3.092150 0.0020 
LDR -3.517518 1.073700 -3.276071 0.0011 
C 465.5195 776.7098 0.599348 0.5490 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.042054    Mean dependent var 310.6696 
Adjusted R-squared 0.026913    S.D. dependent var 3992.825 
S.E. of regression 3938.728    Akaike info criterion 19.41069 
Sum squared resid 1.02E+11    Schwarz criterion 19.51761 
Log likelihood -64775.22    Hannan-Quinn criter. 19.44762 
F-statistic 2.777547    Durbin-Watson stat 1.554138 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
    
 
Dependent Variable: ZROE   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 04/08/17   Time: 06:40   
Sample (adjusted): 2005M11 2013M12  
Periods included: 98   
Cross-sections included: 109   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 6685  
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
ARNING: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SOE 147.1550 93.53730 1.573222 0.1157 
LOCAL -48.99209 87.56276 -0.559508 0.5758 
FOREIG 436.6229 179.4491 2.433129 0.0150 
VENT -52.36990 34.47856 -1.518912 0.1288 
LNTA -42.24877 39.87978 -1.059403 0.2895 
EQTA 71.64262 23.16919 3.092150 0.0020 
LDR -3.517518 1.073700 -3.276071 0.0011 
C 465.5195 776.7098 0.599348 0.5490 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.042054    Mean dependent var 310.6696 
Adjusted R-squared 0.026913    S.D. dependent var 3992.825 
S.E. of regression 3938.728    Akaike info criterion 19.41069 
Sum squared resid 1.02E+11    Schwarz criterion 19.51761 
Log likelihood -64775.22    Hannan-Quinn criter. 19.44762 
F-statistic 2.777547    Durbin-Watson stat 1.554138 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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RANDOM EFFECT 
 
Dependent Variable: ZROE   
Method: Panel EGLS (Period random effects)  
Date: 04/08/17   Time: 06:41   
Sample (adjusted): 2005M11 2013M12  
Periods included: 98   
Cross-sections included: 109   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 6685  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SOE 85.78230 80.10555 1.070866 0.2843 
LOCAL -35.37326 87.57576 -0.403916 0.6863 
FOREIG 441.4999 182.5013 2.419159 0.0156 
VENT -61.91316 31.06008 -1.993336 0.0463 
LNTA -31.45292 40.41282 -0.778291 0.4364 
EQTA 71.69503 22.89445 3.131546 0.0017 
LDR -3.028935 0.911183 -3.324178 0.0009 
C 252.3624 804.2631 0.313781 0.7537 
     
      Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     Period random  0.000000 0.0000 
Idiosyncratic random 3938.728 1.0000 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.032544    Mean dependent var 310.6696 
Adjusted R-squared 0.031529    S.D. dependent var 3992.825 
S.E. of regression 3929.375    Sum squared resid 1.03E+11 
F-statistic 32.08619    Durbin-Watson stat 1.552159 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.032544    Mean dependent var 310.6696 
Sum squared resid 1.03E+11    Durbin-Watson stat 1.552159 
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HAUSMAN TEST 
 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test period random effects   
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Period random 9.253244 7 0.2350 
     
     ** WARNING: estimated period random effects variance is zero. 
     
Period random effects test comparisons:  
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     SOE 147.154983 85.782298 590.813012 0.0116 
LOCAL -48.992092 -35.373258 138.292531 0.2468 
FOREIG 436.622906 441.499853 906.524834 0.8713 
VENT -52.369896 -61.913160 51.340459 0.1829 
LNTA -42.248773 -31.452918 50.612005 0.1291 
EQTA 71.642622 71.695026 0.239396 0.9147 
LDR -3.517518 -3.028935 0.029801 0.0047 
     
          
Period random effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: ZROE   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 04/08/17   Time: 06:41   
Sample (adjusted): 2005M11 2013M12  
Periods included: 98   
Cross-sections included: 109   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 6685  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 465.5195 598.9737 0.777195 0.4371 
SOE 147.1550 248.9213 0.591171 0.5544 
LOCAL -48.99209 125.6336 -0.389960 0.6966 
FOREIG 436.6229 217.3420 2.008921 0.0446 
VENT -52.36990 155.1950 -0.337446 0.7358 
LNTA -42.24877 35.76384 -1.181326 0.2375 
EQTA 71.64262 5.679194 12.61493 0.0000 
LDR -3.517518 0.999420 -3.519562 0.0004 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.042054    Mean dependent var 310.6696 
Adjusted R-squared 0.026913    S.D. dependent var 3992.825 
S.E. of regression 3938.728    Akaike info criterion 19.41069 
Sum squared resid 1.02E+11    Schwarz criterion 19.51761 
Log likelihood -64775.22    Hannan-Quinn criter. 19.44762 
F-statistic 2.777547    Durbin-Watson stat 1.554138 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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UJI MULTIKOLINIERITAS 
 
 
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary        
Date: 04/08/17   Time: 06:43        
Sample (adjusted): 2005M11 2013M12        
Included observations: 6685 after adjustments       
Balanced sample (listwise missing value deletion)       
          
          Correlation         
Probability ZROE  SOE  LOCAL  FOREIG  VENT  LNTA  EQTA  LDR   
ZROE  1.000000         
 -----          
          
SOE  -0.013825 1.000000        
 0.2584 -----         
          
LOCAL  -0.032896 -0.130022 1.000000       
 0.0071 0.0000 -----        
          
FOREIG  -0.015436 -0.062188 -0.141234 1.000000      
 0.2070 0.0000 0.0000 -----       
          
VENT  -0.013872 -0.090769 -0.206143 -0.098595 1.000000     
 0.2568 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----      
          
LNTA  -0.084084 0.447764 -0.031244 0.108845 0.050073 1.000000    
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0106 0.0000 0.0000 -----     
          
EQTA  0.174813 -0.076607 -0.187139 -0.188161 0.006243 -0.430402 1.000000   
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6098 0.0000 -----    
          
LDR  0.002843 -0.052272 -0.195358 0.184514 0.171400 -0.072572 0.204869 1.000000  
 0.8162 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----   
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5. ROBUSTNESS CHECK 1 
 
 
COMMON EFFECT 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 02/03/17   Time: 18:09   
Sample: 2005M09 2013M12   
Periods included: 100   
Cross-sections included: 110   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 6919  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SOELOC 0.954839 0.059162 16.13942 0.0000 
VENFOR 0.730470 0.085599 8.533609 0.0000 
LNTA 0.188185 0.019361 9.719767 0.0000 
EQTA 0.042615 0.004344 9.810799 0.0000 
LDR -0.003577 0.000493 -7.261437 0.0000 
C -2.000420 0.316272 -6.324999 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.067297    Mean dependent var 1.564191 
Adjusted R-squared 0.066623    S.D. dependent var 2.278151 
S.E. of regression 2.200955    Akaike info criterion 4.416527 
Sum squared resid 33487.97    Schwarz criterion 4.422460 
Log likelihood -15272.97    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.418572 
F-statistic 99.75851    Durbin-Watson stat 0.082201 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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FIXED EFFECT 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 02/03/17   Time: 18:09   
Sample: 2005M09 2013M12   
Periods included: 100   
Cross-sections included: 110   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 6919  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SOELOC 1.042425 0.048332 21.56819 0.0000 
VENFOR 0.963480 0.070994 13.57135 0.0000 
LNTA 0.137777 0.015159 9.088693 0.0000 
EQTA 0.033373 0.003339 9.995408 0.0000 
LDR -0.000994 0.000503 -1.975254 0.0483 
C -1.388514 0.255447 -5.435630 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.328649    Mean dependent var 1.564191 
Adjusted R-squared 0.318403    S.D. dependent var 2.278151 
S.E. of regression 1.880816    Akaike info criterion 4.116348 
Sum squared resid 24104.32    Schwarz criterion 4.220180 
Log likelihood -14135.51    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.152148 
F-statistic 32.07393    Durbin-Watson stat 0.073529 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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RANDOM EFFECT 
 
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel EGLS (Period random effects)  
Date: 02/03/17   Time: 18:10   
Sample: 2005M09 2013M12   
Periods included: 100   
Cross-sections included: 110   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 6919  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SOELOC 1.015556 0.050735 20.01698 0.0000 
VENFOR 0.900747 0.077173 11.67180 0.0000 
LNTA 0.153500 0.016487 9.310497 0.0000 
EQTA 0.035906 0.003752 9.568793 0.0000 
LDR -0.001738 0.000519 -3.346536 0.0008 
C -1.118738 0.277320 -4.034111 0.0001 
     
      Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     Period random  0.425342 0.0487 
Idiosyncratic random 1.880816 0.9513 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.077413    Mean dependent var 0.792936 
Adjusted R-squared 0.076746    S.D. dependent var 2.094096 
S.E. of regression 1.959295    Sum squared resid 26537.88 
F-statistic 116.0124    Durbin-Watson stat 0.069050 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.022169    Mean dependent var 1.564191 
Sum squared resid 35108.25    Durbin-Watson stat 0.078550 
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HAUSMAN TEST 
 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test period random effects   
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Period random 577.579287 5 0.0000 
     
          
Period random effects test comparisons:  
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     SOELOC 1.042425 1.015556 0.000005 0.0000 
VENFOR 0.963480 0.900747 0.000009 0.0000 
LNTA 0.137777 0.153500 0.000003 0.0000 
EQTA 0.033373 0.035906 0.000000 0.0000 
LDR -0.000994 -0.001738 0.000000 0.0000 
     
          
Period random effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 02/03/17   Time: 18:10   
Sample: 2005M09 2013M12   
Periods included: 100   
Cross-sections included: 110   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 6919  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -1.388514 0.249440 -5.566524 0.0000 
SOELOC 1.042425 0.055776 18.68960 0.0000 
VENFOR 0.963480 0.064143 15.02087 0.0000 
LNTA 0.137777 0.014911 9.239833 0.0000 
EQTA 0.033373 0.002613 12.77393 0.0000 
LDR -0.000994 0.000473 -2.102178 0.0356 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.328649    Mean dependent var 1.564191 
Adjusted R-squared 0.318403    S.D. dependent var 2.278151 
S.E. of regression 1.880816    Akaike info criterion 4.116348 
Sum squared resid 24104.32    Schwarz criterion 4.220180 
Log likelihood -14135.51    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.152148 
F-statistic 32.07393    Durbin-Watson stat 0.073529 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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UJI MULTIKOLINIERITAS 
 
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary      
Date: 02/03/17   Time: 18:13      
Sample: 2005M09 2013M12      
Included observations: 6919      
Balanced sample (listwise missing value deletion)     
        
        Correlation       
Probability ROA  SOELOC  VENFOR  LNTA  EQTA  LDR   
ROA  1.000000       
 -----        
        
SOELOC  0.155842 1.000000      
 0.0000 -----       
        
VENFOR  0.041207 -0.306703 1.000000     
 0.0006 0.0000 -----      
        
LNTA  0.121206 0.191784 0.121184 1.000000    
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----     
        
EQTA  0.054979 -0.206815 -0.126860 -0.424032 1.000000   
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----    
        
LDR  -0.060651 -0.214593 0.263177 -0.064263 0.200163 1.000000  
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----   
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6. ROBUSTNESS CHECK 2 
 
 
COMMON EFFECT 
 
Dependent Variable: ROE   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 02/03/17   Time: 18:14   
Sample: 2005M09 2013M12   
Periods included: 100   
Cross-sections included: 110   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 7020  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SOELOC 8.869920 1.842522 4.814010 0.0000 
VENFOR 25.12474 1.692864 14.84156 0.0000 
LNTA 1.380421 0.318474 4.334483 0.0000 
EQTA -0.073133 0.042725 -1.711709 0.0870 
LDR -0.034489 0.008777 -3.929239 0.0001 
C -10.53458 5.505922 -1.913317 0.0557 
     
     R-squared 0.034611    Mean dependent var 14.91603 
Adjusted R-squared 0.033922    S.D. dependent var 55.81587 
S.E. of regression 54.86100    Akaike info criterion 10.84834 
Sum squared resid 21110239    Schwarz criterion 10.85420 
Log likelihood -38071.66    Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.85036 
F-statistic 50.29229    Durbin-Watson stat 0.264149 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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FIXED EFFECT 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ROE   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 02/03/17   Time: 18:14   
Sample: 2005M09 2013M12   
Periods included: 100   
Cross-sections included: 110   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 7020  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SOELOC 8.845740 1.848402 4.785616 0.0000 
VENFOR 24.76992 1.638931 15.11346 0.0000 
LNTA 1.197608 0.314034 3.813625 0.0001 
EQTA -0.090156 0.044224 -2.038626 0.0415 
LDR -0.051767 0.010103 -5.123961 0.0000 
C -5.895006 5.400130 -1.091642 0.2750 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.061792    Mean dependent var 14.91603 
Adjusted R-squared 0.047681    S.D. dependent var 55.81587 
S.E. of regression 54.46893    Akaike info criterion 10.84798 
Sum squared resid 20515865    Schwarz criterion 10.95054 
Log likelihood -37971.42    Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.88332 
F-statistic 4.379153    Durbin-Watson stat 0.270636 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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RANDOM EFFECT 
 
Dependent Variable: ROE   
Method: Panel EGLS (Period random effects)  
Date: 02/03/17   Time: 18:15   
Sample: 2005M09 2013M12   
Periods included: 100   
Cross-sections included: 110   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 7020  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SOELOC 8.869920 1.842522 4.814010 0.0000 
VENFOR 25.12474 1.692864 14.84156 0.0000 
LNTA 1.380421 0.318474 4.334483 0.0000 
EQTA -0.073133 0.042725 -1.711709 0.0870 
LDR -0.034489 0.008777 -3.929239 0.0001 
C -10.53458 5.505922 -1.913317 0.0557 
     
      Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     Period random  0.000000 0.0000 
Idiosyncratic random 54.46893 1.0000 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.034611    Mean dependent var 14.91603 
Adjusted R-squared 0.033922    S.D. dependent var 55.81587 
S.E. of regression 54.86100    Sum squared resid 21110239 
F-statistic 50.29229    Durbin-Watson stat 0.264149 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.034611    Mean dependent var 14.91603 
Sum squared resid 21110239    Durbin-Watson stat 0.264149 
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HAUSMAN TEST 
 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test period random effects   
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Period random 106.634774 5 0.0000 
     
     ** WARNING: estimated period random effects variance is zero. 
     
Period random effects test comparisons:  
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     SOELOC 8.845740 8.869920 0.012429 0.8283 
VENFOR 24.769919 25.124736 0.034004 0.0543 
LNTA 1.197608 1.380421 0.009195 0.0566 
EQTA -0.090156 -0.073133 0.000073 0.0456 
LDR -0.051767 -0.034489 0.000006 0.0000 
     
          
Period random effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: ROE   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 02/03/17   Time: 18:16   
Sample: 2005M09 2013M12   
Periods included: 100   
Cross-sections included: 110   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 7020  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -5.895006 7.196292 -0.819173 0.4127 
SOELOC 8.845740 1.601033 5.525022 0.0000 
VENFOR 24.76992 1.853824 13.36152 0.0000 
LNTA 1.197608 0.429879 2.785919 0.0054 
EQTA -0.090156 0.074896 -1.203750 0.2287 
LDR -0.051767 0.013644 -3.794037 0.0001 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.061792    Mean dependent var 14.91603 
Adjusted R-squared 0.047681    S.D. dependent var 55.81587 
S.E. of regression 54.46893    Akaike info criterion 10.84798 
Sum squared resid 20515865    Schwarz criterion 10.95054 
Log likelihood -37971.42    Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.88332 
F-statistic 4.379153    Durbin-Watson stat 0.270636 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
91 
 
 
 
 
UJI MULTIKOLINEARITAS 
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary      
Date: 02/03/17   Time: 18:17      
Sample: 2005M09 2013M12      
Included observations: 7020      
Balanced sample (listwise missing value deletion)     
        
        Correlation       
Probability ROE  SOELOC  VENFOR  LNTA  EQTA  LDR   
ROE  1.000000       
 -----        
        
SOELOC  0.035339 1.000000      
 0.0031 -----       
        
VENFOR  0.153738 -0.303710 1.000000     
 0.0000 0.0000 -----      
        
LNTA  0.085716 0.192713 0.119544 1.000000    
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----     
        
EQTA  -0.075093 -0.207428 -0.125750 -0.428994 1.000000   
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----    
        
LDR  -0.005383 -0.208762 0.265061 -0.063098 0.196866 1.000000  
 0.6520 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----   
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7. ROBUSTNESS CHECK 4 
 
 
 
COMMON EFFECT 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ZROA   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 04/08/17   Time: 06:44   
Sample (adjusted): 2005M11 2013M12  
Periods included: 98   
Cross-sections included: 110   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 6807  
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SOELOC -1045.999 107.6676 -9.715079 0.0000 
VENFOR -331.1990 179.7330 -1.842729 0.0654 
LNTA -149.2378 45.05044 -3.312681 0.0009 
EQTA 61.60741 26.44190 2.329916 0.0198 
LDR -5.213054 1.047109 -4.978521 0.0000 
C 3945.616 918.1587 4.297314 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.029320    Mean dependent var 1453.144 
Adjusted R-squared 0.028606    S.D. dependent var 5671.805 
S.E. of regression 5590.092    Akaike info criterion 20.09626 
Sum squared resid 2.13E+11    Schwarz criterion 20.10228 
Log likelihood -68391.62    Hannan-Quinn criter. 20.09834 
F-statistic 41.08528    Durbin-Watson stat 1.112082 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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FIXED EFFECT 
 
Dependent Variable: ZROA   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 04/08/17   Time: 06:45   
Sample (adjusted): 2005M11 2013M12  
Periods included: 98   
Cross-sections included: 110   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 6807  
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SOELOC -1042.532 108.1245 -9.641952 0.0000 
VENFOR -307.1048 185.3789 -1.656633 0.0976 
LNTA -176.3252 45.86168 -3.844718 0.0001 
EQTA 59.92538 27.04384 2.215861 0.0267 
LDR -6.042511 1.219877 -4.953375 0.0000 
C 4460.142 883.8185 5.046445 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.048869    Mean dependent var 1453.144 
Adjusted R-squared 0.034398    S.D. dependent var 5671.805 
S.E. of regression 5573.402    Akaike info criterion 20.10441 
Sum squared resid 2.08E+11    Schwarz criterion 20.20770 
Log likelihood -68322.38    Hannan-Quinn criter. 20.14005 
F-statistic 3.376977    Durbin-Watson stat 1.124172 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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RANDOM EFFECT 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ZROA   
Method: Panel EGLS (Period random effects)  
Date: 04/08/17   Time: 06:46   
Sample (adjusted): 2005M11 2013M12  
Periods included: 98   
Cross-sections included: 110   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 6807  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SOELOC -1045.082 107.5530 -9.716907 0.0000 
VENFOR -324.7336 181.0268 -1.793842 0.0729 
LNTA -155.3761 45.08033 -3.446649 0.0006 
EQTA 61.24646 26.49029 2.312034 0.0208 
LDR -5.401130 1.076156 -5.018908 0.0000 
C 4058.502 917.1685 4.425034 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     Period random  292.2065 0.0027 
Idiosyncratic random 5573.402 0.9973 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.029599    Mean dependent var 1303.296 
Adjusted R-squared 0.028885    S.D. dependent var 5662.692 
S.E. of regression 5580.091    Sum squared resid 2.12E+11 
F-statistic 41.48824    Durbin-Watson stat 1.112277 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.029314    Mean dependent var 1453.144 
Sum squared resid 2.13E+11    Durbin-Watson stat 1.112081 
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HAUSMAN TEST 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test period random effects   
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Period random 21.273750 5 0.0007 
     
          
Period random effects test comparisons:  
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     
SOELOC 
-
1042.531695 -1045.082386 133.261211 0.8251 
VENFOR -307.104773 -324.733621 268.592700 0.2821 
LNTA -176.325215 -155.376077 78.328763 0.0179 
EQTA 59.925379 61.246460 0.603205 0.0889 
LDR -6.042511 -5.401130 0.052318 0.0050 
     
          
Period random effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: ZROA   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 04/08/17   Time: 06:47   
Sample (adjusted): 2005M11 2013M12  
Periods included: 98   
Cross-sections included: 110   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 6807  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 4460.142 748.2389 5.960853 0.0000 
SOELOC -1042.532 166.8964 -6.246579 0.0000 
VENFOR -307.1048 191.0094 -1.607799 0.1079 
LNTA -176.3252 44.71165 -3.943608 0.0001 
EQTA 59.92538 7.805622 7.677207 0.0000 
LDR -6.042511 1.404579 -4.302008 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.048869    Mean dependent var 1453.144 
Adjusted R-squared 0.034398    S.D. dependent var 5671.805 
S.E. of regression 5573.402    Akaike info criterion 20.10441 
Sum squared resid 2.08E+11    Schwarz criterion 20.20770 
Log likelihood -68322.38    Hannan-Quinn criter. 20.14005 
F-statistic 3.376977    Durbin-Watson stat 1.124172 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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UJI MULTIKOLINIERITAS 
 
 
 
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary      
Date: 04/08/17   Time: 06:48      
Sample (adjusted): 2005M11 2013M12      
Included observations: 6807 after adjustments     
Balanced sample (listwise missing value deletion)     
        
        Correlation       
Probability ZROA  SOELOC  VENFOR  LNTA  EQTA  LDR   
ZROA  1.000000       
 -----        
        
SOELOC  -0.096844 1.000000      
 0.0000 -----       
        
VENFOR  -0.029634 -0.308362 1.000000     
 0.0145 0.0000 -----      
        
LNTA  -0.107707 0.194699 0.118648 1.000000    
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----     
        
EQTA  0.138910 -0.207695 -0.127760 -0.425963 1.000000   
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----    
        
LDR  -0.011431 -0.215358 0.262427 -0.067318 0.201389 1.000000  
 0.3457 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----   
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8. ROBUSTNESS  CHECK 4 
 
 
 
COMMON EFFECT 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ZROE   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 04/08/17   Time: 06:48   
Sample (adjusted): 2005M11 2013M12  
Periods included: 98   
Cross-sections included: 109   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 6685  
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SOELOC -24.51028 67.93579 -0.360786 0.7183 
VENFOR 87.33739 65.64943 1.330360 0.1834 
LNTA -24.03338 31.89377 -0.753545 0.4511 
EQTA 70.28515 22.06656 3.185143 0.0015 
LDR -2.822602 0.849206 -3.323813 0.0009 
C 139.4751 666.1056 0.209389 0.8342 
     
     R-squared 0.031865    Mean dependent var 310.6696 
Adjusted R-squared 0.031141    S.D. dependent var 3992.825 
S.E. of regression 3930.164    Akaike info criterion 19.39165 
Sum squared resid 1.03E+11    Schwarz criterion 19.39776 
Log likelihood -64810.58    Hannan-Quinn criter. 19.39376 
F-statistic 43.96677    Durbin-Watson stat 1.551058 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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FIXED EFFECT 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ZROE   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 04/08/17   Time: 06:49   
Sample (adjusted): 2005M11 2013M12  
Periods included: 98   
Cross-sections included: 109   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 6685  
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
WARNING: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SOELOC -27.37391 68.41834 -0.400096 0.6891 
VENFOR 87.93238 68.30070 1.287430 0.1980 
LNTA -28.96345 31.26662 -0.926338 0.3543 
EQTA 70.67239 22.50701 3.140017 0.0017 
LDR -3.315657 1.010537 -3.281084 0.0010 
C 256.5189 645.4765 0.397410 0.6911 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.041366    Mean dependent var 310.6696 
Adjusted R-squared 0.026511    S.D. dependent var 3992.825 
S.E. of regression 3939.543    Akaike info criterion 19.41080 
Sum squared resid 1.02E+11    Schwarz criterion 19.51569 
Log likelihood -64777.62    Hannan-Quinn criter. 19.44703 
F-statistic 2.784539    Durbin-Watson stat 1.553017 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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RANDOM EFFECT 
 
Dependent Variable: ZROE   
Method: Panel EGLS (Period random effects)  
Date: 04/08/17   Time: 06:50   
Sample (adjusted): 2005M11 2013M12  
Periods included: 98   
Cross-sections included: 109   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 6685  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SOELOC -24.51028 67.93579 -0.360786 0.7183 
VENFOR 87.33739 65.64943 1.330360 0.1834 
LNTA -24.03338 31.89377 -0.753545 0.4511 
EQTA 70.28515 22.06656 3.185143 0.0015 
LDR -2.822602 0.849206 -3.323813 0.0009 
C 139.4751 666.1056 0.209389 0.8342 
     
      Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     Period random  0.000000 0.0000 
Idiosyncratic random 3939.543 1.0000 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.031865    Mean dependent var 310.6696 
Adjusted R-squared 0.031141    S.D. dependent var 3992.825 
S.E. of regression 3930.164    Sum squared resid 1.03E+11 
F-statistic 43.96677    Durbin-Watson stat 1.551058 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.031865    Mean dependent var 310.6696 
Sum squared resid 1.03E+11    Durbin-Watson stat 1.551058 
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HAUSMAN TEST 
 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: Untitled   
Test period random effects   
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Period random 9.156184 5 0.1030 
     
     ** WARNING: estimated period random effects variance is zero. 
     
Period random effects test comparisons:  
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     SOELOC -27.373909 -24.510284 75.753149 0.7421 
VENFOR 87.932378 87.337386 165.300996 0.9631 
LNTA -28.963453 -24.033384 49.105098 0.4817 
EQTA 70.672389 70.285151 0.347948 0.5115 
LDR -3.315657 -2.822602 0.030134 0.0045 
     
          
Period random effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: ZROE   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 04/08/17   Time: 06:50   
Sample (adjusted): 2005M11 2013M12  
Periods included: 98   
Cross-sections included: 109   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 6685  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 256.5189 536.5385 0.478100 0.6326 
SOELOC -27.37391 118.4309 -0.231138 0.8172 
VENFOR 87.93238 137.2656 0.640600 0.5218 
LNTA -28.96345 31.98748 -0.905462 0.3653 
EQTA 70.67239 5.518347 12.80680 0.0000 
LDR -3.315657 0.995171 -3.331745 0.0009 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.041366    Mean dependent var 310.6696 
Adjusted R-squared 0.026511    S.D. dependent var 3992.825 
S.E. of regression 3939.543    Akaike info criterion 19.41080 
Sum squared resid 1.02E+11    Schwarz criterion 19.51569 
Log likelihood -64777.62    Hannan-Quinn criter. 19.44703 
F-statistic 2.784539    Durbin-Watson stat 1.553017 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UJI MULTIKOLINIERITAS 
 
 
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary      
Date: 04/08/17   Time: 06:51      
Sample (adjusted): 2005M11 2013M12      
Included observations: 6685 after adjustments     
Balanced sample (listwise missing value deletion)     
        
        Correlation       
Probability ZROE  SOELOC  VENFOR  LNTA  EQTA  LDR   
ZROE  1.000000       
 -----        
        
SOELOC  -0.037618 1.000000      
 0.0021 -----       
        
VENFOR  -0.021346 -0.302712 1.000000     
 0.0810 0.0000 -----      
        
LNTA  -0.084084 0.196048 0.110082 1.000000    
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----     
        
EQTA  0.174813 -0.212978 -0.111702 -0.430402 1.000000   
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----    
        
LDR  0.002843 -0.208401 0.259882 -0.072572 0.204869 1.000000  
 0.8162 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----   
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APPENDIX C 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ZROA ZROE SOE LOCAL FOREIG VENT SOELOC VENFOR LNTA EQTA LDR ROA ROE 
 Mean  1442.485  314.9214  0.051682  0.230676  0.064110  0.127463  0.282358  0.191573  15.91537  11.15728  85.88476  1.521421  18.70751 
 Median  678.0386  80.47757  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  15.75468  8.585423  79.97784  0.956197  13.09164 
 Maximum  216580.5  245589.4  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000  20.28809  99.04926  726.7294  17.02348  470.4082 
 Minimum  6.456966 -16.49225  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  11.10509 -1.584381  4.586926 -9.668127 -874.7000 
 Std. Dev.  5274.674  4018.873  0.221402  0.421297  0.244968  0.333516  0.450181  0.393569  1.735998  10.04824  52.86016  2.160081  30.52736 
 Skewness  25.16431  45.15813  4.050120  1.278643  3.559018  2.234168  0.966981  1.567452  0.166910  3.826754  6.309137  1.432370 -4.601939 
 Kurtosis  849.0902  2412.099  17.40347  2.634928  13.66661  5.991505  1.935053  3.456907  2.621885  22.93141  56.61391  10.17987  179.7193 
              
 Jarque-Bera  1.98E+08  1.60E+09  75072.57  1834.516  45208.13  7949.249  1340.033  2759.172  69.94075  125317.3  834007.2  16423.28  8606244. 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
              
 Sum  9517518.  2077852.  341.0000  1522.000  423.0000  841.0000  1863.000  1264.000  105009.6  73615.73  566667.6  10035.29  123394.7 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  1.84E+11  1.07E+11  323.3763  1170.911  395.8813  733.8037  1336.967  1021.851  19881.31  666080.7  18433316  30771.95  6146010. 
              
 Observations  6598  6598  6598  6598  6598  6598  6598  6598  6598  6598  6598  6596  6596 
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